


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**FOREIGN
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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Spring Draft, Manpower Issues Facing Russian Military

93UM0636A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 93 pp 1,3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Oleg Vladykin: "The Spring Draft Plan Is Being Fulfilled. But There Are Unit Manning Problems"]

[Text] Much of the mass media has recently reported that over 100,000 contract servicemen have already been recruited into the Russian Armed Forces. It would seem that this should have an impact. But when you learn that this number of volunteers only partially satisfies ground and naval forces personnel needs, it is not perceived as optimistically. And you immediately begin to think about the other component of the mixed manning principle—about conscription of young men for military service. How is that occurring today?

And this is how matters stand here. Considering the existing socio-political situation in the country and the established legislative standards for release and deferment from military service for many categories of citizens, the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff has been compelled to reduce to a minimum the order for the conscription of young men into the army and navy. Therefore it was fundamentally important to strive to totally fulfill that plan. And this is what the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate [GOMU] reported to us: as of 25 June, the conscription plan was 98% fulfilled in Russia and 70% of the conscripts have already been sent to the troops.

But then again, such high numbers do not at all signify that we have managed to resolve all of the problems associated with the organization of conscription at the present time. As in past years, the North Caucasus is the most complicated region in this sense.

For example, a decision on performance of service by republic citizens only on its territory was recently adopted at a Kabardino-Balkariya Supreme Soviet session. Our Correspondents Nikolay Astashkin and Anatoliy Borovkov reported that Kabardino-Balkariya Military Commissar Colonel Viktor Panov had to speak before the deputies and to explain the provisions of Russian laws that concern military service that are identical for all of the country's citizens. After this, an understanding of the impossibility of totally implementing their decision was noted among the people's elected officials. However, they still intended to tempt fate in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and to appeal there to create a special conscription regime for the republic's youth.

Similar phenomena are occurring in other areas of the North Caucasus. Say, the presence of the contradiction of two peoples in North Ossetia continuously results in

cases of direct or indirect violation of the Law "On Military Obligation and Military Service". Based upon information of Republic Military Commissariat Department Chief Lieutenant Colonel Khabizh Kushkhov, as of this moment they have managed to place less than half of the young people who are subject to conscription into the army's ranks.

Unfortunately, the position of the Cossack Host is not distinguished by a coherence of views on military service, the prestige of which has recently markedly increased in the region. In accordance with the Russian Federation Presidential Edict, the rapid creation of Cossack armed formations is required here but they are insisting on their dual subordination—both to the army and to the Ataman. Many Cossack leaders do not accept the arguments that this will undermine the troop command and control system under contemporary conditions.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate is closely tracking all of the specific features of the development of the situation and the socio-political trends in various areas and on the possibility of accepting them on the rolls while carrying out their tasks. Therefore, right now a significant portion of the conscripts from south Russian oblasts, krays, and autonomies are being sent for service, if not to units deployed near the youths' native hearths, then at least to the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. And the order for conscription has actually been totally removed from Chechnya this year.

There haven't been any serious problems in Kalmykiya. The position of the republic's new leadership is not entering into contradiction with Russian normative-legal acts that are in force on questions of the conscription of young men for military service. The local authorities and military commissariats have established a mutual understanding. We think that this circumstance will not only not detract from but, on the contrary, will increase the prestige and influence of Kalmykiya's First President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov and the administration he heads.

Well, how do matters stand with the draft in other regions of the Russian Federation.

In an interview with our Correspondent Vladimir Shironov, Maritime Kray Military Commissar Major-General Nikolay Palukha explained the situation that has developed in the Maritime Kray. He noted that there are no grounds for special concern with regard to the fulfillment of the plan for shipment of conscripts to the troops. The only thing that causes alarm is the poor health of many conscripts. They have had to send a significant number of conscripts for medical checkups and treatment.

But even after such steps, new recruits with obvious signs of dystrophy are arriving at units. Pacific Ocean Fleet Organizational-Mobilization Directorate Chief Rear Admiral Viktor Fedorov told our correspondent that several of them are 25 kilograms under normal weight.

Nothing else can be done with them except to place them in the hospital for increased feeding. In order not to repeat the story with the garrison on Russkiy Island...

And this is what our Siberian Military District Correspondent Aleksandr Veklich reports. The fact that the order is being fulfilled largely at the expense of rural youth has become a specific feature of the current draft in this region. Only 11% of draft age city dwellers will be putting on a military uniform. Nine of ten young men have the right to release or deferment.

But Novosibirsk Oblast Deputy Military Commissar Colonel Vladimir Terentyev asserts that the number of young people subject to the draft has decreased by another third since the initiation of the draft boards' work. Like in the Maritime Kray, here doctors have "rejected as defective" a significant number of young people. The celebrated Siberian health has now become a legend.

To this day, another problem is making itself known. People who are evading military service are practically not being held criminally responsible. Last year, the Novosibirsk Oblast Military Commissariat sent cases on 225 such citizens to the procurator organs. But only one man was convicted for violating the law and the rest avoided criminal liability. Naturally, this practice is also provoking dozens of conscripts to evade service this year.

And yet, despite all of the existing contradictions, military commissariats are managing to recruit the number of conscripts prescribed by the orders. In this sense, the example of Russia's northwestern region is indicative. For example, the military commissariat in St. Petersburg even overfulfilled GOMU's task—102%. Our Correspondent Valeriy Streltsov reported to the editorial staff that the overwhelming majority of future soldiers and seamen have already been sent to units.

Deputy City Military Commissar for Personnel Lieutenant Colonel Stepan Zholovan thinks that the spring draft's good organization and high success rate became possible thanks to the attention of the St. Petersburg mayor's office to that issue and to its comprehensive assistance to the military commissariats. Not so long ago, no one other than the military commissariats themselves were seriously involved with draft problems. In general, the city did not allocate resources to them. This spring the picture is entirely different. Notification of conscripts, transportation needs, investigation of draft evaders, and other measures that require substantial expenditures were totally financed by the local administration.

Well, here's the latest data for Moscow. Deputy City Military Commissar Colonel Vladimir Dobrovolskiy reported them to the editorial staff. In the capital as of 25 June, conscripts who total 103% of the GOMU plan task have been processed by the draft boards and have been assigned for shipment to the troops. He stated that 69.5% of those drafted have already left for the service. So, it would seem that this year the young men of the country's

two largest cities do not deserve the conscription rebukes of being inadequately patriotic or of being chronically tied to their mothers' apron strings. It's rather that a certain shortage of sickly Siberians and Cossacks who willingly leave their native parts only to trade at northern markets will be covered at the expense of the citizens of Moscow and St. Petersburg and, of course, with the further zeal of the military commissariats of both capitals.

Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate personnel do not doubt that the conscription plan will be totally realized in the next few days. And we could be happy about that if we forget for a time about the serious personnel undermanning that still exists in the troops. There will be a shortage of more than half of the soldiers and seamen in many military units and on ship crews, after the arrival of the young replacements and with the military personnel on contract. In general, the order for the conscription needs a rapid increase in order to, along with the gradual introduction of contract service, satisfy Armed Forces personnel requirements in a balanced manner and to actually completely realize the Armed Forces mixed manning principle.

Discontent With Law 'On Military Duty and Military Service'

93UM0719A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 33,
13 Jul 93 (Signed to press 12 Jul 93) p 3

[Article by Oleg Boldyrev under the rubric "The Draft": "The Russian Army Is Deep in the Hole: Students and the Government Are to Blame"]

[Text] The military units and formations will be receiving replenishments of 18-year-olds throughout the month of July, even though the military draft officially ended on 30 June. As usual the results are not comforting. Preliminary estimates indicate that only 75,000 recruits will join the armed forces this time, while 580,000 are being discharged "from the ranks."

While Russia lost 90 percent of its draft pool, located in the republics of Central Asia, it inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union's weapons and combat equipment. The manning in many military units is short by 80 percent.

Nonetheless, heads will hardly be flying in the rayon military commissariats, which are responsible for the draft of new recruits. They are fulfilling their induction plans by a minimum of 90 percent. The explanation for this success in a manpower situation in the units in which officers are standing guard duty and sweeping the streets is simple. The military commissariats equate 100 percent to the number of those not entitled to a deferment for reasons of health or enrollment at an institute. At best these make up only around 30 percent of the total number of 18-year-olds residing within a rayon. Practically the entire 30 percent end up in the army, to be sure,

because, as one worker with a military commissariat sarcastically put it, "these are people who cannot even fake a medical certificate."

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense have repeatedly stressed the fact that the Law on Military Duty and Military Service, which was passed by the Supreme Soviet in February and which establishes 30 types of deferment for induction into the military service is leaving the army without personnel. Despite the fact that the implementation of some of these deferments was postponed, the main stumbling block, the induction of students into the military, still exists. And 1,515,000 of the 1,814,000 young men who reached the age of 18 this year will not join the army precisely on the grounds that they are students. The decision of the Ministry of Defense to cut the number of military departments at VUZs [higher educational institutions] by at least a third by September of this year will hardly have any effect over the next 3 years, before the current second-year students find themselves facing a year of service following their graduation from the VUZ.

Oleg Glushkov and Vladimir Engelberg, experts with the Committee on Defense and Security of the Armed Forces, say that no possibility of a change or restriction on the application of the articles of this law are being called for in the parliament at the present time. However, according to them, the number of VUZs whose students take advantage of the right to a deferment may be reduced considerably in the future. A decision on the matter will not be made until the end of September. Its adoption will most likely be strongly opposed by VUZ rectors, since many educational institutions, particularly in the provinces, will be faced with closing if they lose the deferment privilege.

At the same time representatives of the parliamentary committee feel that criticism is also due the government for its failure to take action. It did not submit to the Supreme Soviet a draft concept for Russia's national defense, a document specifying how many people would be needed from which rayons to maintain the army's combat capability.

On the other hand, the large-scale reduction and disbandment of military units which cannot be fully manned and are not of strategic importance is no longer possible, according to the parliament's experts, because of the extraordinary cost of destroying or dismantling military equipment and ammunition. Furthermore, according to a statement by the aforementioned worker with the General Staff of the Armed Forces concerning a complete lack of any kind of methods for conducting such operations, the number of military units disappearing from the map of Russia is still near zero.

Spring Draft Results Mean Poor Prospects for Fall Draft

93UM0727A Moscow KOMMERSANT DAILY
in Russian 16 Jul 93 p 4

[Article by KOMMERSANT DAILY Correspondent Ilya Bulavinov, under the rubric: "Results of the Army Draft": "The Russian Army Doesn't Have Enough Soldiers"]

[Text] Yesterday a press conference was held at the Russian Ministry of Defense during the course of which the results of the current spring draft into the Russian armed forces were made public. The leaders of the General Staff Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate shared the problems which they encountered last spring and also described certain prospects of the impending fall draft.

In his introduction, Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate First Deputy Chief Lieutenant-General Vladimir Bondartsev said manning the army was the most important problem under contemporary conditions and noted that the missions with which the directorate was tasked during the course of the spring draft have been totally accomplished. Nevertheless, the figures he cited attest to the fact that the military department still has many unresolved problems despite contract service recruitment that began in January 1993.

This spring, 170,000 men were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces which only satisfied 13% of the army's needs. First of all this is associated with the fact that only 16% of the total number of draft age individuals who are on the military register appeared at induction centers due to an entire series of existing deferments and restrictions. In the process, approximately 270,000 soldiers and sergeants were released from the army. Thus, on the whole the armed forces will be manned to only 51% of authorized peacetime strength. It noted that there can be no question of full-fledged combat training and service of troops since servicemen are carrying out their duties on the brink of their physical capabilities under the conditions that have developed.

The prospects for the fall draft cause even greater concern among the General Staff leadership. Based upon preliminary calculations, as of 1 January 1994, the army will be 30-35% manned since approximately 150,000 men will be drafted for military service in the fall but more than 320,000 servicemen will have to be released from the Armed Forces. The situation is aggravated by the fact that recruitment for contract service has been halted due to a catastrophic shortage of resources.

Vladimir Bondartsev noted that in the situation that has developed the Ministry of Defense will be compelled to resort to extreme measures and to once again appeal to the Russian Armed Forces to lower the requirements for deferments and medical restrictions, to stop granting deferments to students of higher and middle educational institutions for 2-3 years, and also to delay enactment of the Law "On Alternative Service" until 1997. Furthermore, the Ministry

of Defense has submitted a petition to the Russian government to allocate an additional 12 billion rubles to recruit another 50,000 contract servicemen.

Existence of Kremlin Evacuation Regiment Noted

93UM0734A

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA on 30 July 93 page 2 notes the existence of an motor-vehicle regiment, formed in 1982, for the evacuation of the Kremlin archives and property of members of the Politburo in emergency situations. Now, the regiment is subordinated to the State Committee on Emergency Situations and is based in Noginsk. It has been used as part of the UN effort transporting foodstuffs in the former Yugoslavia, and evacuating people from Abkhazia.

CIS: POLICY

Draft Deferments Cause Recruiting Deficit

93UM0706A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 33,
13 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Oleg Boldyrev under the rubric "Draft": "The Russian Army Is Experiencing a Deep Shortage. The Students and the Government Are to Blame"]

[Text] Eighteen year-olds will continue to replenish military units and large units during the month of July. However, the spring draft ended officially on 30 June. Its results were inauspicious, as usual: According to preliminary estimates, only 75,000 people will reinforce the Armed Forces this time whereas 580,000 are to be discharged "from the ranks."

Russia lost 90 percent of draftee resources, for which the republics of Central Asia accounted, after the disintegration of the USSR; it inherited an overwhelming proportion of weaponry and combat materiel of the Soviet Union. The shortage of personnel in many military units comes to 80 percent.

Nonetheless, heads will hardly roll in rayon military commissariats responsible for calling up new recruits. Draft plans are, at the very least, 90 percent fulfilled here. Against the background of a catastrophic personnel situation in military units where officers often do guard duty and sweep the pavement themselves, the secret of this success is simple: Military commissariats consider only those not entitled to deferments by reason of an illness or in conjunction with attending college to be 100 percent of draftees. The number of those comes, at best, to just about 30 percent of the total number of 18 year-old young men residing in a rayon. To be sure, virtually all of these 30 percent end up in the army because, as a functionary of a military commissariat observed sarcastically, "these are people who cannot even arrange for fake medical findings."

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense have stressed repeatedly that the Law on the Military Service Obligation and Military Service adopted by the Supreme Soviet in February, which establishes a total of 13 types of draft deferments for military service, leaves the army without manpower resources. The main bone of contention—the drafting of students—remains to this day, despite the enactment of some types of deferment having been delayed. Meanwhile, out of 1.814 million people who have reached 18 this year, 1.515 million will not be drafted into the army precisely by reason of being student. The decision of the Ministry of Defense to reduce the number of chairs of military science in colleges by at least one-third by September of this year will hardly produce any effect in the three years to come, until such time as the current second-year students face the prospect of serving for a year upon graduating from college.

As experts of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Oleg Glushkov and Vladimir Engelberg note, to date the parliament has not been officially considering prospects for any amendment or restrictions on the effect of the provisions of the adopted law. However, in their words, the number of colleges whose students will enjoy the right to deferment may be reduced considerably. A decision concerning this will not be made until the end of September. Most likely, its adoption will be strongly opposed by the rectors of colleges because many educational establishments, especially in the provinces, will face the threat of being closed down after the deferment privileges are lost.

At the same time, representatives of the parliamentary committee believe that criticism should be leveled against the inaction of the government which has failed to submit to the Supreme Soviet a draft concept of the national security of Russia—a document specifying how much personnel is required and in which regions in order to maintain the combat readiness of the army.

On the other hand, in the words of parliamentary experts, wholesale reductions and disbandment of military units which cannot receive a full complement and are not strategically significant is already impossible in view of the extremely high cost of procedures to destroy or dismantle materiel and munitions. The number of military units which have disappeared from the map of Russia is still close to zero, judging by the quoted pronouncement of a functionary of the General Staff of the Armed Forces concerning the complete absence of any method for carrying out such operations.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Lt-Gen Potapov on Future of Fortified Areas

93UM0646 Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian
No 4, 22 Mar 93 pp 32-34

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Vladimir Yakovlevich Potapov by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Kutishchev: "One Cannot Get By Without Fortified Areas!"]

[Text] *A serious and detailed discussion devoted to the increasingly sensitive problems of fortified areas [URs] has been underway on the pages of VOYENNNYY VESTNIK for some three years now. Military specialists, in analyzing the current state of URs, talk about the history of their creation and their role of in the Great Patriotic War and local conflicts, and set forth new approaches to the utilization of URs and various points of view on the effectiveness of fortified structures in modern warfare.*

The interest in this topic is justified. We cannot remain indifferent toward the future of fortified areas during the reforming of the armed forces.

Years in the lives of many people, after all, have been given over to them, and a great deal of funds have been expended on creating them. Many thus do not agree with the opinion that URs have outlived their time and are in contradiction with contemporary military theory—views on the conduct of airland operations, for example. Such views are buttressed by the lack of a clearly pronounced potential enemy or threat of the unleashing of aggression. Is that not why the authors of some features feel that URs are losing their significance?

VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, in order to look into this issue better, asked some questions of Lieutenant-General V. Potapov. His choice was no accident. There are perhaps more fortified areas on the territory of Primorye Kray, covering the coastline and land sectors, than anywhere else. And who else, if not the commander of the army stationed there, would know the strong and weak points of fortified areas and be able to judge the prospects for their utilization?

[V. Kutishchev] Comrade Lieutenant-General, there have been changes in the tasks being performed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation due to the altered situation around the world. The discussion today centers chiefly on highly maneuverable combat operations. Today I would therefore like to try and look anew at the role of fortified areas. Have they lost their significance or not, in your opinion?

[V.Ya. Potapov] Let's discuss it together and try to look at the problem from various viewpoints. Then I think we will find the correct answer. I would like to remind you, first of all, that the tasks being performed by the formation in Primorye Kray are of a defensive nature. That conforms entirely to the policy being pursued by the Russian government.

Fortified areas are, first and foremost, complexes of strong engineer and fortification structures with units and subunits, covering the most important operational sectors and areas on the holding of which the firmness of the defense depends. They are strong lines for the operations of other troops during the initial period of a war as well.

In the event an enemy penetrates into neighboring sectors, the UR can be a solid foundation for supporting

the maneuvering of manpower and equipment. That alone is enough to say that fortified areas are essential.

[V. Kutishchev] As far as is known, that was the role relegated to them in the organizational development plans of the Red Army. But much water has flowed since that time. The armed forces have changed. Their combat capabilities have changed in qualitative fashion. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, to which the opponents of URs refer, shows that they did not fulfill the role that was relegated to them anyway.

[V.Ya. Potapov] I will permit myself not to agree with those who hold such views. Fortified areas did not justify themselves chiefly because of gross mistakes that were made by the political leadership of the country. Recall that they were disarmed and mothballed, and some simply destroyed, on the eve of war on the Western border.

The enemy troops were kept from a breakthrough, and developed their offensive in other sectors, in places where the defense had been prepared in advance and well. Here is a shining example.

Finnish troops attacking from the north in the area of Leningrad in 1941 were stopped by the garrison of the famous Karelian UR. And for some reason they have come to forget altogether today that we were forced to erect a host of fortifications in hurried fashion around Leningrad in August of forty one. And the Krasnogvardeyskiy UR was one of the main ones during the first year of the war. The Leningrad fortified area, which made the city unassailable to the enemy, was created at a colossal cost by August of forty two.

One must also not forget that the Brest fortress was also none other than a UR.

We will turn now to the experience of contemporary local conflicts, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in particular. Fortified areas created by the Israeli troops on the Golan Heights became impregnable to the attackers. Suffice it to say that the Syrians were not able to take them, even though they possessed a superiority of many times over in manpower and equipment.

We are thus justified in saying that URs have not lost their significance today, and will still play an important role in possible future armed conflicts.

Let us look at the problem, finally, from an economic point of view. The upkeep of machinegun and artillery units costs the state considerably less than motorized-rifle and tank units. There are fewer vehicles, armored personnel carriers and tanks in them, after all. That means that less fuel and other material resources for combat training and the vital activity of the subunits are required.

And, perhaps, the chief argument. Enormous amounts of funds have already been invested in the construction of fortified areas. A most complex system of engineer structures and obstacles, along with military compounds,

has been created. So now we should toss all of that to the whims of fate? And then, in case of extreme necessity, restore them again?

I thus suggest that we turn again to foreign experience. Japan, by way of example, has preserved its coastal fortifications built during World War II. They are kept up in model fashion even today.

China does the same thing. They even built new structures there in the 1970s. Why should we reject what we have?

[V. Kutishchev] The people's money should undoubtedly not be thrown out the window. But contemporary combat operations nonetheless are not the local conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s. Air-mobile forces, some specialists feel, are moreover able to conduct large-scale operations in the rear, far from the border where the URs are located. The question suggests itself—what will the troops defending the fortified areas be doing then?

[V.Ya. Potapov] Being in constant combat readiness! Sooner or later those who land in the rear will run out of fuel, ammunition and food. An enemy will hardly be able to deliver the matériel he needs by air, having lost the element of surprise. Ground troops inevitably follow the air-mobile forces. And they will have to accomplish the main tasks. It is right there that the fortified areas will become a serious obstacle.

And then—who will let an enemy assault run around in the rear for long? We will bring up troops, and they will have to withdraw. And the URs are again in the way, ready for all-round defense.

And last. Fortified areas can cover state borders more successfully than troops brought up in haste from deep inside the country. The results of exercises conducted in the district in the middle of the 1980s testify to that.

So any way you look at it, the Russian Army cannot get by without URs. Especially under conditions of cutbacks in the armed forces.

[V. Kutishchev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, if fortified areas have not lost their significance, why are they experiencing such difficult times?

[V.Ya. Potapov] There are many reasons. I would say that one of the principal ones is this. To this day we do not have an appropriate state program for the development of fortified areas, and for which the necessary funds would be allocated. Why, you ask? Because money and matériel even for the development of many promising areas in the realm of new military technologies has been allocated according to the whatever's-left-over principle in recent years. Forget about URs!

Matters are no better with manning the fortified areas with personnel. You can count the soldiers on your fingers in some units. There is a great shortage of officers and warrant officers. There are problems with housing, fuels, building materials... The absence of human and

material resources does not permit the full resolution of problems connected with the upkeep of facilities, the servicing of equipment, the protection of storage areas and the support of the teaching process. This pertains as well to questions of combat alert duty in the event that a military threat arises. The main task today is to preserve the engineer structures of the fortified areas that were created with such labor over many years.

[V. Kutishchev] Perhaps it makes sense to return to the *komendatura* units for defensive lines that existed until the 1960s? Or to use the Cossacks?

[V.Ya. Potapov] *Komendatura* units for the forward defensive lines, in my opinion, could ease the problem to a certain extent. But once again, where do you get the people? Bring in the Cossacks? The structures of the Amur and Ussury Cossack troops have still not been conclusively formulated. Many traditions have been lost, and are only today being resurrected. I thus feel that it is still too early to be talking about the transfer of border facilities to Cossack administration.

The corresponding mechanism on how to resolve this has also not taken shape. The possibility of bringing in the Cossacks to serve on the forward lines of Russia, including in fortified areas, has not been ruled out in the future. But I repeat once again that the corresponding mechanism for that is essential.

[V. Kutishchev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, the permanent machinegun and artillery units of the URs should always be maintained at their standard wartime levels, since there will not be enough time to mobilize them. It is only because that was not the case that the fortified areas did not play their role in 1941.

Are we not repeating old mistakes, if you recall that undermanned subunits are located a considerable distance from their inactivated facilities? And that the weapons, ammunition and much more is stored in dumps?

[V.Ya. Potapov] I agree—we are repeating them. And questions of the combat application of fortified areas should be considered at the highest level, in my opinion, in order to rectify them. Everything should be reckoned up and weighed carefully. It must finally be decided whether Russia needs fortified areas or not. If so, then a state program for their development or, at least, the immediate imparting of a "pre-restructuring" structure to the URs, should be developed and adopted in the near future. They should be manned with personnel, the subunits transferred to the military facilities and the training process and combat alert duty organized. Then many of the problems of the fortified areas will cease to exist.

From the editors: While the material was being prepared for press, Lieutenant-General V. Potapov was assigned to a higher position and left for his new place of service.

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Technical Data, Profile of 2A36 "Giatsint-B" Towed Cannon

93UM0695A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jul 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Vitaliy Moroz, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "Giatsint' Has Variations"]

[Text] In the 13 April 1993 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, we discussed the 2S5 "Giatsint" 152-mm long-range self-propelled cannon that was accepted into the inventory in 1976. Three years later, the towed version of this weapon was put into production: the 2A36 "Giatsint-B". The Bryansk motor vehicle builders developed the BAZ-6953 twin-engine prime mover, that is also capable of transporting both the crew and the basic load of ammunition, to tow it. Having eight drive wheels, the prime mover freely moves along a tank route. Towing is facilitated by the fact that the cannon's track coincides with the motor vehicle's.

At a firing position, the gun, that was built based upon a classic design, is leveled with leveling jacks.

Tactical-Technical Data of the 2A36 "Giatsint-B" 152-mm Cannon

Maximum firing range, in kilometers	28.5
Projectile muzzle velocity, in meters per second	942
Rate of fire, rounds per minute	5-6
Angle of elevation, in degrees	
—elevation	-2.5 to +57
—deflection	+25
Crew	8 men
Weight, in kilograms	
—of the gun	9,800
—of a high-explosive fragmentation round	46

Problems Accommodating Airborne Division in Ulyanovsk

93UM0711A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 93 p 2

[Article by Maj Vadim Ziyatdinov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stringer: "We Are Not Counting Your Mortars"]

[Text]

The Airborne Troops Are Becoming Settled in Ulyanovsk, but There Are More Problems Than Solutions Right Now

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already described how the accommodation of the 104th Guards Airborne Division, which was withdrawn from Azerbaijan to Ulyanovsk, is proceeding. Steps taken at the state level have made it

possible rapidly to resolve many problems involved in housing the personnel, officers' families and warrant officers and to organize the training process.

It is still too early to say that everything is fine, however. Here is what our correspondent saw when he recently spent some time with the airborne troops.

At the checkpoint into the military unit several people recited in a not entirely friendly manner: "Airborne troops, go home! We don't need you." This was perhaps the only "public political" act in the past month, however. It demonstrated more than anything else the breakthrough in relations between the military and civilians. The airborne troops have been accepted not just officially but also at the unofficial level. This occurred when the latest rumors that the airborne troops would "undermine the city's good food supply situation" and "mistreat the local youth" proved to be unfounded.

Difficulties developed after the military reported to local authorities that the entire division had arrived in the oblast, however. They were told in response: "But we did not expect the last subunit until August or September." Nor did some people like it when the airborne troops rejected one of the three deployment sites at the last minute.

But then the airborne troops too have many complaints. Restoration is presently underway on the post of the former 26th Directorate of Military Construction Workers, which still reminds one of a bastion taken by storm. In many buildings there are holes in the roofs, the wiring has been ripped out, radiators, pipes and sinks have been removed.... Russia's Ministry of Defense is spending enormous amounts to rectify things.

The housing problem is still not being resolved at the practical level. Some of the people were lucky. They managed to rent apartments at a cost of 20,000 rubles per month or more. Some are staying in hotels, where they have to pay 500 rubles per day, when their compensation is only 4,000 rubles per month. The rest have until recently made do with accommodations at division headquarters, which has given the facility the appearance of a room for "mothers with children" at a terminal. These families have now moved into barracks totally unsuited for life in cold weather.

The airborne troops somehow learned that two five-story dormitories were vacant at the All-Russian Aviation Center in Ulyanovsk. When they enquired about moving into the buildings temporarily, however, they were told: You should not concern yourselves with that. We are not counting how many mortars you have.

The airborne troops hoped to lessen the severity of the housing problem with the garrison's help, and the Ulyanovsk military schools had to make room for them. Even here there were conflicts, though. The same space in the school's dormitories had been promised both to

the VDV [airborne troops] division and to a subunit being withdrawn from Kazakhstan.

And what lies ahead? It is planned to construct three buildings with 348 apartments next year. The issue of allocating an acceptable plot of land for the construction has still not been decided, however. Furthermore, housing is not the only problem. Jobs have to be provided for more than 700 officers' wives, and space has to be found in schools and kindergartens for the children, and the city itself is experiencing an acute shortage of space.

In general, the airborne troops have plenty of problems pertaining to living conditions, but they do not let this overshadow their main concern, the combat readiness. Not everything is going smoothly in this area either, to be sure. Many enlisted men from what are now CIS states are serving out their terms in the division. They will be discharged, but the question is whether there will be fitting replacements for them. The draft situation continues to be a difficult one, after all. Taking their example from the Ulyanovsk military schools, the airborne troops plan to set up special courses for training specialists for the VDV in the city's general education schools. They need the approbation of local authorities and their financial assistance for this, however.

The problem of acquiring an airfield is equally acute. Next to the city is a former DOSAAF airfield, but Moscow cannot seem to decide what to do with it.

Vyacheslav Trifonov, chairman of the standing commission on defense and social protection for servicemen of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Soviet, believes that most of these issues could be removed from the agenda. "We need more determined support from the center for this, however."

Designer on 'Shturm-S' Anti-Tank Missile System

93UM0733A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 93 p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Viktor Litovkin, under the rubric: "Russia's New Weapon": "Sergey Nepobedimyy's Tank Destroyers"]

[Text] In September 1964, having been to demonstration field training exercises with live fire in the Moscow suburb of Kubinka where the latest domestically produced anti-tank weapons—Designer Sergey Nepobedimyy's "Malyutka" PTURS [anti-tank guided missile system]—were demonstrated to the highest leadership, CPSU Central Committee First Secretary N. Khrushchev told Japanese correspondents in the categorical nature that was characteristic for him:

"Tanks are no longer needed. Antitank guided missile systems will destroy them all."

At that time, Nikita Sergeyevich did not manage to eliminate either tube artillery, aircraft carriers,

destroyers, cruisers or, naturally, tanks. They—the ground forces strike force—have continued to rapidly develop.

But Khrushchev still turned out to be correct in something: along with tanks, first lagging behind a bit and then abruptly overtaking, awesome and effective tank destroyers were developed—anti-tank guided missiles, including those that were developed at Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau under the leadership of the Laureate of the Lenin and three State Prizes, Hero of Labor, Academician Nepobedimyy.

I know that the absolute majority of our readers are becoming acquainted with this gentleman for the first time. His name and picture are appearing in the central press for the first time after a half-century of absolute secrecy. And meanwhile, Sergey Nepobedimyy is the author of 28 types of Russian weapons, among which are not only anti-tank guided missiles but also the "Strela" and "Igla" portable antiaircraft missile complexes, the "Tochka" Tactical Missile System, and the unique "Oka" Operational-Tactical Missile that was destroyed under the INF Treaty.

This story is about his latest "Shturm-S" anti-tank complex.

From "Malyutka" that has remained in our army's inventory, yes and not only it, including the former Warsaw Treaty countries, for more than a quarter century and that was extremely cheap—500 rubles, it is distinguished not only by the fact that it is not guided by wire but by a super-high frequency radio signal and it has supersonic flight speed. This was the first anti-tank guided missile in the world with that speed.

Furthermore, "Shturm" can be used under all weather conditions, either hot or cold. It destroys with the first round tanks, BMP [infantry fighting vehicle], tactical and SAM missile systems, permanent firing positions, armored or concrete—in any climate and with a range of temperatures from minus 40 to plus 50.

Nepobedimyy's system can conduct fire, during the day and at night, against helicopters, low-flying aircraft and other small targets. If you consider that there are 12 missiles in its combat load, their rate of fire is 3-4 missiles per minute, and that they are installed on a Saratov Assembly Plant light armored vehicle (Chief Designer Viktor Petrov), and they can travel through swamps, water, sand, and climb into the mountains—it's clear that this complex is priceless in battle.

It has a 130-mm missile, its weight with packaging is 76 kg (packaging—a transport-launch canister that serves as a launcher rail during launch) and its announced firing range is from 400 to 5,000 meters. Its announced armor penetration capability is 560 mm.

Why am I using the utilizing the term "announced"? Because this is classified information. And it still remains restricted. For the Modernized "Shturm" missile. We cannot name the maximum figures. But if you know the tactical-technical specifications of the latest American Nightrider anti-tank guided missile, you can say that the new "Shturm" exceeds it in practically all parameters, including armor penetrating capability. It has ... In a word, right now no armor exists that it cannot penetrate.

While discussing "Shturm" with me, Sergey Pavlovich Nepobedimyy said:

"Right now tanks are very powerful. They are covered with good, multi-layer armor that is located at an inconvenient incline for a person firing the missile and with dynamic protection (plates of explosives that cause the premature detonation of projectiles and anti-tank guided missiles that are flying into the tank—V.L.); the premature detonation is safe for the vehicle being attacked. And I need to put such designers' ideas into my complex that will permit improvement of the system without creating new plants and production."

Nepobedimyy and his colleagues always manage to stay a bit ahead of the tank designers, thanks largely to the "know-how" that has been put into the design of the anti-tank complex. Incidentally, Nikolay Gushchin has replaced Sergey Pavlovich in the post of Kolomna Design Bureau Chief Designer after Nepobedimyy retired.

Here a very powerful warhead with "clever" detonation and a small hole solid-fuel projectile that was developed at "Soyuz" NPO [Scientific Production Association] under the leadership of Academician Boris Zhukov and a semiautomatic jam-proof missile guidance system and a unique optical gunsight with 8-power magnification and a high-speed guidance apparatus...

It's interesting that Nepobedimyy's anti-tank guided missile complexes are installed not only on tracked prime movers but also on the MI-24V and MI-28 ground forces and on the naval KA-29 helicopters. They are capable of firing both the new and the old missiles. So, those hundreds of thousands of anti-tank guided missiles that have laid in the depots since the Cold War will still be able to destroy and be fired at live-fire exercises and in training.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

V-Adm Kaysin on Development of Fleet Command and Control

93UM0666A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 4, Apr 93 pp 33-36

[Article by Naval Main Staff Operations Directorate Chief Vice-Admiral Yu. Kaysin, under the rubric: "Questions of Theory": "Specific Features of the Structural Development of the Fleet Command and Control System at the Current Stage"]

[Text] The issues of organizing the support of fleet command and control as a purposeful activity of the commanding admiral (commander) and his staff for maintaining combat readiness of subordinate forces and while preparing operations (combat operations) and accomplishing assigned missions has always occupied one of the leading places in the structural development of the Navy and in its combat and operational training. Today when we are living under conditions of global changes, we need to single out those distinctive conditions of structural development and employment of naval forces that affect the utilization and development of their command and control systems. We can cite the following as primary conditions:

1. A review of the foreign policy of Russia—the legal successor of the former USSR—and, as a consequence, the need to define the new military doctrine and the state's structural development concept for the Armed Forces, including the Navy.

The orientation toward rigid confrontation and combat with a specific naval enemy—the Navies of the United States and NATO—is receding into the past. A qualitatively new situation has arisen for the navy when we require an adequate response to be provided to any, including one that suddenly arises, threat to Russia's national interests in the sea and ocean areas, and first of all, in the waters adjacent to its coast.

At the present time, we can single out more than 300 maritime areas on the map of the World Ocean to which at least two or more states lay claim. This gives rise to a multitude of problems, contradictions and disagreements. The political resolution of disputed maritime and coastal issues was not always effective and in a number of cases resulted in military conflicts in which the navy played a leading role.

The increasing significance of naval forces in the policy of the leading world powers and also Russia's Navy as one of them, maintenance of peace and stability, accomplishment of peacekeeping functions in various regions of the world, the conduct and support of foreign policy actions, and rendering assistance to the population when extraordinary situations arise will entail some or other changes in the functioning of the entire command and control system. But if those fleet command and control system elements such as command posts, communications systems and automated command and control systems were developed on a simple basis and were standardized, training of staffs and prior planning would be specifically oriented on a definite circle of tasks and therefore require thorough analysis and comprehension at the present time.

As a result, the need arises to redistribute the efforts of staffs, to focus attention on perfecting issues of the direct preparation and conduct of operations (combat operations), not only within the framework of a large-scale war, but also under conditions of the outbreak of regional conflicts and local wars and the performance of

certain foreign policy actions. In so doing, we need to take into account the fundamentally new approaches to the creation of active forces in the ocean and sea zones and their command and control during the course of an operational deployment. This will require additional knowledge and skills from admirals and staff officers and consideration of not only purely military but also political, economic, and social issues. We need to learn how to command and control forces that are operating as part of multinational forces, including under the aegis of the UN and to ensure their coordination.

A comprehensive approach to the training of command and control elements and naval forces that provides for a combination of the required intensity of the conduct of measures of operational, combat and mobilization training with rational utilization of assets during the course of combat training is becoming one of the primary directions to maintain the prescribed level of fleet combat readiness.

Fleet staff exercises in the Northern and Baltic Fleets were the largest and most instructive training measures in 1992. There they worked out the following issues: bringing the fleets to the highest levels of combat readiness; adjustments to operations plans during the course of changes of the operational-strategic situation; organization of the work of command authorities and staffs to prepare for the fleet's first operation; fleet command and control while introducing security and defense plans; supporting operational deployment, withdrawal of forces from under attack, and repelling the first massive enemy strike and destroying his primary targets.

During the course of these exercises, an evaluation was conducted of the quality of the training of combat crews of fleet, large formation and formation command posts. It was established that the professional training and competence of individual officers in the issues of their performance of their functional duties is not always being taken into account when manning combat command and control teams and operational post crews of command posts and command and control posts. At some headquarters, the assignment of tasks to forces was carried out with inadequate precision. Specifically, the overall concept of operations and the developing operational situation in the ocean areas and maritime zones was not completely taken into account. More thorough work of headquarters of all levels to organize coordination of forces in accordance with the overall plan of operations is required to overcome this deficiency.

At the same time, the results of the operational, combat, and mobilization training measures that were conducted in the 1992 training year indicated that fleet command and control elements on the whole were prepared to carry out their assigned tasks. In the process, we need to view the expansion of studies while conducting the measures indicated above for the purpose of clarifying individual provisions of strategy, operational art, and tactics and also substantiation of ways of improving the authorized organizational structures of large formations

and formations and operational plans as the most effective methods for improving the quality of training of fleet command and control elements.

Under contemporary conditions, we need to more thoroughly analyze the military-political situation in the world (for the fleets, first of all, in the zones of their responsibility), to learn to adequately react to its changes and to predict its development.

During the course of the realization of treaties for the reduction and restriction of strategic offensive weapons, primary efforts in the activities of the appropriate staffs must still be concentrated to a greater degree on maintaining the prescribed readiness of naval strategic nuclear forces, ensuring the undetectability of their operations in peacetime and enhancing their capability to resist during the course of conducting combat operations. This requirement is determined by the increasing ratio of naval strategic nuclear forces in the overall system of Russia's strategic forces triad.

Current conditions raise still higher the personal responsibility of leaders of all levels for the combat readiness of the command and control system for the fulfillment of tasks according to their role and toughen the requirements for a precise delimitation of the functional duties of command and control elements of various levels while commanding and controlling forces and for the professional knowledge and skills of admirals and officers to ensure the rational utilization of existing naval assets. All of this was and remains the primary factors that define the success of the execution by fleet command and control elements of the tasks assigned to them.

2 The complication of the economic situation. The economic difficulties that are currently being experienced by our state have had a substantial impact on the level of material support and financing of the Navy and, consequently, on the possibilities for development and improvement of the command and control system's combat and technical readiness. The practice of fleet activities shows that new difficulties are arising with maintaining the technical elements of fleet command and control systems in serviceable condition (carrying out planned inspection and repair work and capital construction). The price has risen for electrical energy, fuel, lubricants, and other technological mediums that support the normal operation of these systems. All of this is occurring in the background of the reduction of appropriations allocated to support functioning of the command and control system. The situation is also being complicated by the inability to place orders for the development and manufacture of communications systems, ASU [automated command and control systems], technological equipment and ZIP [spare parts, tools, and accessories kit] for them in a number of sovereign states

and former republics of the USSR, due to the disruption of traditional economic ties and the cooperation of industry.

Here perhaps only one variation of operations is possible—thrift. We need to ensure that mode of utilization of command posts, communications and automation systems that would, on the one hand, correspond to the level of activity of the forces and ensure sufficiency of their combat readiness and also the conduct of operational and combat training of the forces themselves and their command and control elements in accordance with the assigned missions and, on the other hand, would be oriented on the preservation of the technical elements of the command and control system. We need to seek new approaches to attain that goal along with traditional methods (joint utilization of systems, various reserve modes, conservation of individual elements, etc.). For example, having created the material vested interest of servicemen and employees in the resolution of the issue of the optimal utilization of technical systems and energy resources, we can save hundreds of thousands of rubles without reducing combat readiness. It would be advisable to disseminate the obtained experience and interesting developments and solutions to the fleets, including through the military press.

The second aspect of this problem—is ensuring the improvement of the Navy's command and control system. Under the current conditions of arms reductions, the problem is more urgently posed of preventing the Russian Navy from lagging behind in the development of its fleet command and control systems in comparison with those which the Navies of the leading world powers have. Today we can say that the "arms race" has receded into the past, however the "command and control and support systems race" continues and is even gaining momentum based on new scientific and technological achievements. And it is no accident that the improvement of these systems is permitting the realization to a greater degree of potential fleet strike capabilities that is especially important under conditions of their quantitative reduction. Therefore, it is very important during the development of the Navy's structural development plans to define the priority of some work or other and to assess its proportion in the resolution of the entire complex of missions the navy faces and to ensure its priority financing. In the process, it is advisable to conduct basic research and development of new combat systems on the basis of integration both at the level of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Armed Forces services) and also of state institutes. Financing fleet command and control systems must correspond to its contribution to the resolution of defense tasks.

3. Reduction of the strength of the Armed Forces. This process will unquestionably entail the reduction and reorganization of ground and naval forces command and control elements. In the process, under conditions of the instability of the military-political situation that is complicating the resolution of the missions facing the Navy, the main thing becomes the maximum reduction of the

negative impact on the quality of the functioning of command and control elements that is caused by strength reductions of operational personnel who participate in fleet command and control processes. Under these conditions, not all of the problems are being resolved through the saturation of the appropriate elements with modern high-capacity automation and computer equipment systems, although they compensate for the indicated complications to a definite and even to a significant degree. During the course of the reorganizations that are being conducted, we also need to take into account the fact that the current authorized organizational structure of staffs must:

- correspond to the nature of the tasks assigned to it, the composition of subordinate forces, the work methods utilized and the capabilities of the command and control systems;
- be as close as possible to the requirements of wartime and ensure their leading readiness with regard to subordinate forces; and
- ensure a rational ratio of one-man command and decision-making by committee [kollegialnost]

An expert assessment of the amount and content of their command and control activity has important significance when determining the strength and authorized organizational structure of fleet large formation and formation headquarters. In the process, it is advisable to clarify not only the list of missions being carried out but to also analyze the information flows and data on the degree of technical equipment of each subunit. We must strive for the maximum standardization of the structures of command and control elements: from the Navy's Main Staff to the headquarters of fleet formations and units. This will permit us to more flexibly react to possible changes of the composition and nature of force operations and to ensure more precise coordination.

4. There is a new state border and a change of the fleet basing system. And this factor substantially impacts the effectiveness of the Navy's command and control system. The disposition of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla command and control system facilities today raise quite a few questions on the organization of their use and support. In the process, the majority of these issues require resolution at the interstate level. A large number of communications systems currently remain outside the borders of Russia, the loss of which can reduce the probability-time characteristics for disseminating combat command and control orders to Navy forces for a definite period of time which can have a particularly negative impact in the event of the deterioration of the military-political situation in various areas, and all the more so in the initial period and during the course of any conflict.

We can resolve these problems by signing and creating a mechanism for the realization of interstate treaties on joint utilization and long-term leasing of Navy transmission-reception centers, cable communications circuits,

fortifications, etc. However, the problem can only be partially resolved in this manner. Furthermore, this requires the more rational utilization, on the scale of the entire Navy, of those financial and material resources which have been allocated for the creation of a command and control system in new fleet basing areas, maximum use of dismantled equipment, and also an increase of the number of mobile command posts that are equipped with automation and communications systems. This will permit ensuring and enhancing the survivability of the entire command and control system.

In conclusion, let's point out that the current military-political and geostrategic situation in the world has endured significant changes. The probability of the outbreak of a total nuclear war and large-scale aggression against Russia has been reduced. However, at the same time the danger has arisen of the outbreak of local conflicts and regional wars that directly threaten the Russian Federation's national security or has been directly targeted against it. The Navy's large formations are also being reduced and reformed and new formations and the command and control systems that correspond to them are being created on Russian territory within the framework of the Armed Forces military reform that is being conducted. The creation of a modern, small, but powerful Navy that is capable of ensuring, jointly with the other services of the Armed Forces, reliable defense of the state from any infringements on it from the naval axes is the end goal of that reform.

The radical changes that are occurring in the content and nature of armed combat at sea require the introduction of adjustments to the issues of fleet command and control both in peacetime and during the course of the conduct of military operations. In the process, the specific features of all command and control system elements that ensue from the new approaches to the operational employment of naval forces in operations and combat operations must be totally taken into account.

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Overview of Problems Facing Northern Fleet's ASW Air Wing

93UM0640A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 93 pp 1,3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Vladimir Shirokov, Valeriy Gromak and Aleksandr Pilipchuk, and NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARYA correspondent Valeriy Polikarpov: "The Deck-Based Pilots Are Losing Their 'Deck,' but They Believe Their Problems Can be Solved"]

[Text] On 26 February last year a serious flight accident occurred in a shipboard ASW regiment of the Northern Fleet's air force. A Ka-27 PS [search and rescue] helicopter fell into the Barents Sea and sank. The 29 February and 18 April 1992 issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA contained articles on the disaster, which took the lives of seven airmen. It seemed that the subject had

been exhausted. The times have now made it urgently necessary to return to the subject, however.

The flight personnel themselves named as the primary and main cause the fact that there had been a lengthy disruption of their flights from the ship's deck. The commission which investigated the accident could not ignore their opinion, of course, although they moved this cause from first to third place, after the usual—and, I would add, justified in many respects—conclusions of error in piloting techniques and deficiencies in the organization of flights. But then the quality of the flight training and the level of flight supervision depend upon the intensity of the combat training. What is its level in the regiment today?

It is most frequently enough just to learn about the on-coming flight shift to determine in general the degree of an air unit's combat readiness.

"It involves the restoration of flight techniques in the area of the airfield and over the sea following a break in the flights," Col Gennadiy Stepanov, the new regimental commander, told the newspaper. "We have not flown to the ships in more than year...."

Not a single pilot in the regiment—this is worth repeating, not a single pilot—not a single instructor-pilot, including Col Stepanov, a sniper-pilot, has access to deck landings today, even in the daytime in good weather. Some of the regiment's pilots have not flown even once this year. Despite all the difficulties, however, they have managed to get three crew commanders, recent school graduates, into the air. Pilots V. Petrenko, B. Shaykin, A. Larionov, S. Checherov, V. Oboskalov and the commander himself are prepared to provide intensive instruction.

The pressure of economic difficulties, which have heavily affected the fleet, have grounded the airmen. There is a shortage of fuel and lubricants, and spare parts. Aircraft-carrying ships of the Northern Fleet, except for the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, which are designated for the joint basing of the regiment's aircraft, have been confined to plant walls for a long time now. The fleet's ship-repair base has lost many of its suppliers in adjacent foreign parts and is experiencing an acute shortage of money.

"We understand it all, but we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. It jeopardizes not just the regiment's combat readiness but flight safety as well," Col Stepanov said in summary.

Naval pilots of the Pacific Fleet are also experiencing difficult times. We know that the heavy aircraft carriers Minsk and Novorossiysk, not old according to the commonly accepted standards, have been removed from its fleet of vessels. This instantly left the naval attack and ASW aircraft without a deck. The number of large ASW ships with helicopter pads is also being cut. Our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent found Capt 1st Rank

Fedor Gnatusin, department chief in the Pacific Fleet's Combat Training Directorate, planning the forthcoming cruise for a group of ships.

"The fleet's aircraft are also to take part in the comprehensive training exercise," Fedor Ivanovich said. "The problem, however, lies in the fact that we have only five ASW ships with helicopter pads left. Even those go to sea infrequently."

It is indeed a problem. Nor has it bypassed the Baltic Fleet. The Yantar shipbuilding plant in Kaliningrad has stopped building the large ASW ships whose helicopter pads were used by the naval airmen for practicing take-offs and landings during the testing of BPK [large ASW ships] and for drilling their crews in the Baltic area. Lt-Gen Vasily Proskurnin, commander of Baltic Fleet Aviation, nonetheless advised the journalists not to dramatize the situation.

"Our helicopter pilots practice landing on a pad on land. This enables them to retain some of their skills," the Commander of Baltic Fleet Aviation said. Then, as though sensing that his answer was not satisfactory, the veteran naval pilot added:

"Back during my stint in the polar regions I suggested setting up several floating platforms as helicopter pads on drilling towers in each fleet, which could be used for practicing 'deck' take-offs and landings without involving ships, should this become necessary."

An interesting and very inexpensive proposal. Perhaps we should consider it now, when just such a necessity has developed.

Commenting on this problem, Major-General Aleksandr Artemov (Pacific Fleet) reported that by making maximum use of every cruise for the sake of the deck-based airmen, some of them were still able to run their flying time up to 80 percent of the requirement.

"We succeeded in preserving the backbone of experienced pilots and air specialists. And this was despite the fact that we did not hold on to those who wanted to be released into the reserve. If the fuel problem is completely resolved, we shall work even more intensively to resolve matters pertaining to tactical flight training," Major-General Artemov said in conclusion.

At the headquarters of Major-General Anatoliy Tikhomirov, commander of Naval Aviation, Col Boris Ruchkin confirmed this. Yes, the deck-based aviation has become enmeshed in a large number of problems, as a result of which more than 300 naval air crew commanders have not been in the air yet this year, and the flight plan in certain units during the winter equalled only around 50 percent of the flying time indicated for the six-month period.?

This is primarily because the quadrature of the "floating airfield" has been reduced drastically. Furthermore, the Nitka training complex in the Crimea, where elements of take-offs from a springboard and descents from a glide

path for deck-type landings with simulated hooking of the aircraft by arresting gear could be practiced on a simulator, was taken under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Today, thanks to an agreement between the Sukhoy OKB [special design office] firm and Ukraine, five pilots of a lead group are being trained for the TAKR [heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser] Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov. We need an intergovernmental agreement, though, which would allow us to conduct the large-scale training of a succession of deck-based pilots at the Nitka UTK [training complex]. In the future we should have our own, Russian facility. The command element of the Naval Air Force has begun petitioning for a site and the funds for setting one up in Russia.

The fact was underscored at the headquarters, however, that proficiency in working from a deck cannot be maintained without a deck. Pads and simulators on land, and floating pontoons will enable us to conduct only a minimum of training under simplified conditions. Maximum use should be made of the existing ships. At one time the plans of the airmen and the seamen coincided by 70 percent or more. Today, shared difficulties with spare parts, repair, fuel for the ships and kerosene for the aircraft are continually disrupting the traditional "cooperation." Some specialists of the Directorate of the Naval Air Force are of the opinion that it is not always a matter of fuel (which began to be supplied on a more regular basis in April) which is preventing joint training, let us say, by helicopter crews and seamen. The cap on all resources is in the hands of the fleets' leadership, which (not as a result of the good life, of course) gives priority to the combat readiness of the ships and fleet units.

The airmen in the deck-based air force have more problems than we have mentioned here, of course. There are, after all, problems of a psychological, moral nature. Some of the airmen are developing a sense that they are not needed. Rehabilitation measures for them have not been worked out on the scientific medical level (the pilot of a deck-based aircraft experiences 3.5 units of force when landing). This should be enough to produce alarm about the fate of the naval aviation and cause people to get down to resolving its problems. A modern navy is inconceivable without reliable wings. This is borne out by the experience of all the world's modern navies.

Visit to SSBN Supports Operations in Arctic

93UM0658A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jul 93 pp 1,2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Gundarov: "Service Aboard Nuclear Vessel Continues, Craft Still Travels Under Arctic Ice: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Visits Vessel Returning from Arctic Cruise"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] We are locked into the gloomy aspects of our life. Under these conditions, something which is positive comes across as sensational, in stark contrast with the

usual tragedies and accidents. For example, much has been written about how our Navy is being virtually crushed by the weight of numerous problems. In that light, why do we not speak of the Navy as continuing to carry out its duties in spite of all the difficulties? Ships are accomplishing long-range cruises to extremely diverse areas of the world's oceans. Personnel serving aboard nuclear-powered craft continue to cruise under Arctic ice, something which was always considered to be highly difficult and hazardous for nuclear submariners.

Our correspondent paid a visit to a nuclear-powered missile-armed craft commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Vovyanko. The crew had just returned from a cruise under ice.

The cabin occupied by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Vovyanko has the appearance of a three-room apartment—a small one—consisting of a guest room, bedroom, and study. I tried to imagine the feelings that would be experienced by, say, a family from Moscow, Voronezh, or Orel, if they were told that their apartment is now located at a depth of several hundred meters, with the ocean surface covered by many meters of ice which is stronger than concrete. This kind of feeling is very familiar to the cabin's inhabitant. The Commander moved the coffee glasses aside and placed onto the table atlases of the Arctic Ocean brought by the Navigator.

"This is where I was way back when I was a Senior Lieutenant," said the professional submariner as his hand—white due to lack of exposure to the sun—pointed to a spot on the 72nd parallel. "I crossed the 80th parallel as a Captain-Lieutenant."

Captain 1st Rank Vovyanko has been under the ice about 10 times; engineer officer Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Sosinovich, five times; turbine group officer Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Sadovnikov, twice.

Vovyanko spoke of cruising under two media: water and ice, without emotion, as if this were something ordinary. He also saw fit to display the famous Navy wit.

"The main thing a Commander needs in the Arctic is a teapot," he said before going on to his next story. I expected to hear an unusual sea tale.

"There really was nothing unusual," continued Vladimir Alekseyevich. "We surfaced at the edge of an ice field for a communications session. Ahead was ice, abaft, an iceberg. Conditions were less than ideal, of course, but there was no choice in the matter. Before submerging, all personnel located on the bridge, including myself, went below. We battened down the conning tower hatch. After giving the order to fill the tanks, I usually listen to how water rushes in noisily through the Kingston valves. That time however there was no sound and the boat was not submerging. We checked the instruments. One of them, in spite of the obvious, indicated that the conning tower hatch was not sealed. We ascertained that the monitor lamp did not function as a result of ice formation on the interlock. I dispatched a sailor to the galley with a teapot

so that he could bring hot water. We poured the hot water over the interlock and we then were able to submerge."

I was told while aboard this nuclear vessel about an incident that occurred during the previous cruise in the space where the turbine specialists stand their watch, whereby a pipe carrying water at 70 atmospheres ruptured. Within 15 seconds, 3 tonnes of water in the form of a thick vapor burst out in the space. In this kind of situation, that is, in the case of "clean" water, control of flooding or fire renders it necessary to surface. But not in the Arctic. Division Commander Captain 3rd Rank Igor Gramatunov, who was present in the space, took charge of damage control. The submariners sealed themselves in the space, donned individual protection clothing, and rose to the challenge.

Cruising under ice can at any time require that a man do "more than he ever thought himself capable." This pertains not only to physical efforts, but to mental, moral, and psychological ones as well. Navigational system package power units burned out during a cruise. That left a single gyrocompass, something which is not entrusted even to a first-year cadet in the navigation department of a higher Naval school. Warrant Officer Ivan Povelko, a technician in the navigation group, worked non-stop 36 hours (!) soldering microcircuits and restored the power units. To understand fully what a "high-voltage" effort of a mental and psychological nature the warrant officer exerted, it is sufficient to say that shipboard repair of the power unit is not provided for; technical instructions for this purpose are not to be found aboardship.

A nuclear-powered missile-armed vessel is a complex and—as referred to in ship's language—a "heavy engineering structure." It combines the functions of a space launch facility and nuclear power station. This kind of nuclear vessel supplied electric power to a military installation of 13,000 inhabitants during a hurricane last year. For example, housed in the strong shell of the giant submarine are several thousand electric motors and more than 10,000 illumination devices. We in our everyday living think nothing of a failed electric motor of a shaver or refrigerator, of a burned-out bulb or a "worn-out" television picture tube. That kind of thinking has no place in the mind of submariners as a result of their training and the conditions associated with underwater duty. This is ever more so in the case of cruising under ice. Submariners are well aware that a ship in distress under pack ice will not be the object of rescue—not by surface vessels nor by aircraft. The use of a rescue chamber or inflatable liferafts is out of the question.

It must be that mastery of the Arctic depths over many years is not associated with tragedies (the incidents related to me by crew members were extremely few in number) as a result of counterbalancing of the extreme hazards of cruising by the extreme mind set of man.

Just why is all this done?

"The Arctic theater of naval operations plays an important role in Russia's security system," said Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Berzin, deputy commander of the Nuclear Submarine Strategic Formation. "Cruise conditions are quite difficult. But it is these conditions which afford advantages in promoting the capability of standing up in combat."

We were not the first to notice this feature of the Arctic, and, I am afraid, we are not the last. An "anthology" of extended cruises under ice was compiled by military sailors of the United States. In the period between 1957 and 1962 alone, American Naval Forces' nuclear-powered ships accomplished seven cruises, and in 1958 the nuclear submarine "Nautilus" (the U.S.'s first nuclear-powered submarine) made it as far as the North Pole. In 1991, at a time when Western politicians started to introduce a warming up of international relations, the Pole was visited by the nuclear submarines "Pargo" (USA) and the "Tireless" (Great Britain). It should be understood that those planned excursions were certainly not carried out with natural science purposes in mind. The Americans have already performed a number of Arctic exercises in which practical weapons were used.

In this connection, there are grounds for telling something to the "respected jurors" who are assuming that Russia no longer has a need for an Arctic basin for military purposes: the ice is still there. The Soviet contribution to strategic mastery of an Arctic Ocean well-protected from a potential adversary by the transparent armor is quite substantial. An enormous amount of experience has been accumulated, and this has become the property of the Northern—now a Russian—Fleet. The cruise accomplished by the nuclear-powered vessel commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Vovyancko constitutes another step toward strengthening Russia's defensive capability.

A year ago an American sailor from the cruiser "Yorktown," showing me his ribbon bars, said:

"I received this decoration for my first cruise to the Mediterranean Sea. I got these for two "excursions" to the Black Sea. This one was for an operation at the shores of Libya; this one for the North Star 93 Training Exercise; and these for my third and fourth Mediterranean cruises."

I recalled that event when I looked at the blouses of the officers of the nuclear vessel, the hull of which still seemed to exude Arctic cold.

"Do you not wear your decorations?"

"None are awarded," was the answer.

About two years ago, a request was submitted for awarding a decoration to crew member Aleksandr Afanasyev. The request was returned without action. The only crew member awarded a decoration is the Commander. He received it for a feat performed some time

ago. At one time, the first cruises under ice were marked by the issuance of Gold Stars and orders of the highest distinction. Hanging above today's Arctic submariners is a single common star: the North Star. It follows them while they travel under ice and greets them as they return home. The men are unbelievably tired, but they do so after having accomplished their duty to Russia.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Chief of Rear Services Optimistic About Reforms, Future

93UM0670A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
in Russian No 1, Jan 93 (Signed to press 10 Dec 92) pp 3-7

[Lieutenant-General Vladimir Churanov interviewed by Colonel O. Sedykh: "Timely Interview: 'I Look at the Future of Rear Services With Optimism'"]

[Text] Lt-Gen Vladimir Timofeyevich Churanov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Rear Services, was born in the town of Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Kray, in 1945. He graduated from the Volsk Rear Services Military School in 1966, the Rear Services and Transport Military Academy in 1979, and the General Staff Military Academy in 1987. He has held a number of rear service command posts, serving as a unit supply chief, deputy commander for rear services of a division, chief of rear services for an army, and chief of rear services for the Moscow Military District. He is married and has two children.

[Sedykh] Vladimir Timofeyevich, you have just completed a difficult year of work in the unusual economic situation of the transition to the market economy and reorganization of the army and rear services. What were the year's main results?

[Churanov] It was indeed a difficult year. The disruption of previous economies ties, the virtual paralysis of state supply agencies, and the active introduction of market relations forced us to restructure our operations, literally on the run, and to introduce new methods of supplying the forces. And so it is all the more heartening to say that the tasks that confronted us were accomplished. In addition to their traditional missions, rear service agencies also carried out functions that they didn't previously do: We took part in withdrawing personnel and equipment from the ex-Soviet republics and other countries, supplied forces in "hot spots," and took in and resettled refugees.

In the course of economic reform, the center of gravity in rear services and supply is shifting directly to the local level. Most people understand this and were able to not only adapt themselves to the changed conditions, but also to achieve significant results in providing housing and consumer services for military personnel, introducing progressive training methods, maintaining

reserves, and storing and maintaining equipment. In this connection, I would call attention above all to rear services officers at various levels in the Transbaykal and Moscow military districts, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Northern Fleet, and the command of the Volsk Rear Services Higher Military School, where changes for the better are readily apparent, despite the difficulties.

Needless to say, there were also problems, unsolved issues, and bottlenecks. For example, preparations for winter presented a lot of problems. Rear service agencies worked as hard as they could to complete those preparations. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that they fully mastered the situation. Many measures at the local level were carried out at a slow pace and unsystematically. As a result, a number of units of the Air Defense Forces, the Siberian and Volga military districts, and the Leningrad Naval Base failed to put their barracks, heating systems, dining halls, and vegetable warehouses in proper order before the cold weather set in. I hardly need explain to any reader who has worked in rear services just what kind of problems this can lead to.

[Sedykh] Perhaps the causes of the shortcomings lie not so much in foot-dragging on the part of individual officers as in our overall economic decline, cutbacks in centralized deliveries, and shortages of materials.

[Churanov] We are indeed in a very difficult situation. However, I have felt and continue to feel that it is unbecoming of us to constantly cite circumstances. Let's take a closer look at the situation. Despite the economic difficulties, the country and people have supplied the army with everything it needs, in full. Can you show me someone who has gone without clothing, or shoes, or food? Hence the question is solely one of making sure that the full volume and assortment of all the required rations and allowances are provided to every regiment and platoon and to every soldier.

This is the mission of rear service personnel; we need to show initiative, resourcefulness, and organizational skills. And when it is reported that the personnel of such and such garrison in the Pacific Fleet are not receiving milk and eggs because "there aren't any," or that garrisons in the Far North are not getting enough fruit and vegetables because they "were never delivered," allow me to ask: Why not? Why weren't they delivered?

Or take subsidiary farms. Some people are in all seriousness trying to persuade us that they cannot survive under current conditions. And indeed, we have today quite a few units where livestock herds are declining and plans for deliveries of meat and agricultural products are going unmet. But we also have and will continue to have subsidiary farms that are not only not reducing production but, on the contrary, increasing it. It all depends on who is managing them.

[Sedykh] What qualities do you value most in people, and what demands do you make of your subordinates?

[Churanov] First and foremost, professionalism, competence, a thorough knowledge of one's job, and an ability to effectively organize the work of one's subordinates. These qualities are simply indispensable today; amateurism results in sizable material losses. In the Urals district, for example, when contracts were being concluded for food deliveries, the documents didn't even mention that the products had to be of good quality. There are many instances in which units are supplied with rotten potatoes but no one files any claims, or in which we buy poor-quality onions at a high price when we could have gotten good ones at a lower price.

Another indispensable quality for the rear service officer is honesty, professional commitment, and the dignity of a Russian Army officer. Last year, rear service units were literally swept by a wave of commercialization. Audits and inspections carried out in the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts, in the Northern Fleet, and in the Air Defense Forces uncovered numerous instances of illegal sales of fuel, food, and equipment in short supply to private individuals and organizations. Why this was done is very clear. As we know, a firm barrier has now been erected to such "merchants" in shoulderboards; there is no place for such people in rear service agencies.

As for work style, I prefer to see everyone perform his duties calmly and in a resourceful and skillful manner, as is the custom in civilized countries, and with tact, sophistication, and tolerance in interpersonal relations, without affected prayers for deceased "mothers" and other close and distant relatives. In my opinion, people need to do their work during the workday, not talk about it.

These are the criteria we are using as we select officers in the course of reorganizing rear services. All levels of our structure must be led by capable and well-trained people who are promising in terms of personal qualities and age, people who are committed to the difficult but very important and necessary profession of rear service officer.

[Sedykh] The times mold the people. Market relations will require qualities different from those that existed under the command-distributive supply system. Will today's rear service specialists be able to adapt themselves to the new economic realities and to embrace and carry out rear service reform?

[Churanov] People mold the times in equal measure. Our reform is aimed at ensuring the effective functioning of rear services and the optimum use of the capabilities of rear service personnel under the new conditions. To this end, we are planning, first of all, to realize in practice the principle of combining centralized management of rear services manpower and resources with greater economic independence for them. Second, we are going to make maximum use of existing techniques and methods of military-economic and rear service supply. Third, with due regard for the incipient market, we are going to create a system of orders and purchases and a system of

providing servicemen with housing and consumer services that can flexibly respond to the economic situation.

[Sedykh] In this regard, will rear services agencies undergo certain changes?

[Churanov] Naturally. The organizational measures planned for the first stage of Armed Forces reform are already being completed. For instance, the establishment of an apparatus of the chief of Armed Forces Rear Services in the rear services staff and in corresponding central administrations and departments is virtually complete. Its purpose is to ensure, at the governmental level, close ties between Russia's military-economic and scientific-research complexes and rear service agencies at various levels, and to organize cooperation between the former and the Armed Forces branches and Ministry of Defense chief and central administrations.

The establishment of rear service management agencies in the Armed Forces branches is being completed. I want to call readers' attention to the fact that such a structure has been set up in the Ground Forces for the first time.

In the second stage of reform, which will extend up to 1995, we are going to improve the structure of rear service units and institutions, and in the third and final stage we will complete the reorganization of rear services and switch over to the new organizational system completely.

[Sedykh] As we know, plans call for setting up a fundamentally new formation in the Russian Armed Forces, namely mobile forces. You no doubt have some plans regarding their rear service structures.

[Churanov] The rear services of the mobile forces must have a level of combat readiness identical to that of the units and large units they supply. In order that the mobile forces rear service agencies can be air-lifted and air-dropped, plans call for making them highly mobile and for ensuring that their equipment is as compact as possible (light-weight and with relatively small dimensions). In addition, they will be capable of performing their missions both autonomously and in instances in which mobile forces are incorporated in larger formations.

In connection with the organization of mobile forces, changes will, to all appearances, be made in other rear service structures as well. In particular, plans call for creating and equipping comprehensive rear service supply districts to meet the mobile forces' needs.

[Sedykh] Do the reorganization plans call for creating a fundamentally new rear services model?

[Churanov] I am not in favor of the indiscriminate negation of all prior experience. Much of the experience the rear services have accumulated in their development is fully applicable under the new conditions as well. For example, we are going to continue to give priority to combined-arms principles of organizing rear service units and subunits. At the same time, they must rise to a qualitatively new level through enhanced maneuverability, mobility, and interchangeability.

At the district-army level, we will retain, for the next few years, the supply system that has given a good accounting of itself and that consists in supplying rear service materiel and equipment to units and combined units of all service branches in a given military administrative unit.

But there will also be fundamentally new elements. For example, in devising the concept for rear services development, we came to the conclusion that the most serious problems arise in supplying the aviation units of the Armed Forces branches, especially the Air Force. The rear services agencies that supply aircraft units and large units, in addition to their traditional missions, also perform a number of specialized functions. At the same time, the central rear service, lacking an appropriate agency to manage and oversee Air Force supply, is incapable of effectively influencing its quality. As a result, aviation rear services are forced to try to solve many problems on their own, without our help.

In order to streamline and systematize the process of supplying aircraft units, plans call for setting up specialized aviation rear service administrations (departments) at the center and in the military districts. They will include structures that are charged with planning, ordering and supply functions and that are specifically geared toward supplying and maintaining airfields for the aviation units of all the Armed Forces branches.

[Sedykh] Efforts were once made to introduce a territorial rear service supply system. Is it a part of the new concept for the rear services' development?

[Churanov] It is not only a part of that concept, but also the object of active change and refinements. In my view, the territorial rear service supply system best conforms to the economic conditions that exist in our country and to the situation in which the army now finds itself.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the territorial rear service supply system, we intend to establish two or three self-contained centers of territorial rear service districts within each military district. Each center, under a single management (the center's commanding officer and the corresponding establishment structure of its administrative agencies), will have several stockpiles of basic types of materiel and equipment. In addition, the center will be charged with planning and calculating the materiel and equipment needs of the group of forces it supplies and with shipping stores in a centralized fashion; it will also be authorized to conclude contracts for the delivery of certain types of food products within the borders of the territorial district and to carry out inspections and audits.

[Sedykh] But different areas have different conditions and capabilities. Moreover, the creation of new structures will also require new personnel at a time when the army, as we know, is undergoing rapid cutbacks.

[Churanov] Conditions do indeed vary everywhere. This is why a wide range of rear service officers took part in devising the plan and a series of regional conferences were held for the rear service officers of the Armed

Forces branches, districts and fleets. Moreover, plans call for a period of transition to the new structure, so that necessary changes can be made. The Moscow Military District is the first to introduce the new structures, which it began doing this year. I hope that your journal will tell about how the experiment is going and inform readers of the recommendations developed in the course of it.

There is also a solution to the problem of staffing the centers. It would appear most expedient to base them on administrations for material supply brigades, bases and depots, which, as we know, have stocks of all types of equipment, as well as essential motor transport, and to increase their staffs to the required levels with personnel from the rear service agencies of the Armed Forces branches, military districts, and armies (corps).

The establishment of such centers will make it possible to not only improve supply quality, but also take a considerable burden off of district and fleet rear service agencies and allow them to devote more attention to combat and mobilizational readiness, rear service preparation of theaters of war, and stockpiling and echelonment of reserves. At the same time, they will not lose their supply, inspection and auditing functions.

[Sedykh] Won't the establishment of these centers negate the role of such a time-tested supply unit as the garrison?

[Churanov] On the contrary, we intend to significantly enhance that role. The establishment rear service agencies of units and large units, as we know, are geared primarily toward the fulfillment of wartime functions. Therefore, in providing housing and consumer services to our troops in peacetime, we need to activate large numbers of personnel and equipment from combat units to help them.

In order to finally put a stop to diverting troops to carry out economic functions for which they are not intended, plans call for creating an extensive network of garrison consumer service centers. Organizationally, they will consist of subunits and institutions staffed with supply specialists. They will handle material, consumer-service, medical, and other types of supply for servicemen and members of their families. In addition, the garrison centers will be linked to the entire supply infrastructure: stockpiles, dining halls, stores, repair facilities, polyclinics, and heat plants.

I foresee a question about how the centers will be staffed. I think they will be staffed primarily with civilian personnel, and in areas where the demographic situation makes this impossible, with people who have expressed a desire to perform alternative service.

[Sedykh] Such a substantial reorganization of rear service agencies will undoubtedly entail changes in personnel training.

[Churanov] In view of the measures to reduce the Armed Forces and the changes in the organizational and establishment structure of our forces, we can expect a gradual reduction in the establishment strength of the officer

corps, including in rear service agencies. But this hardly means that rear services will lose their personnel. Some of the posts will be assigned to reserve officers and civilian personnel, the majority of whom, after passing certification exams, will work under contracts.

In connection with this, the training of rear service military personnel is also likely to shift to a contractual basis. In particular, plans call for concluding contracts with cadets who have studied at rear service schools for two years; the contracts will stipulate that the cadets will serve as officers after graduation.

In order to enhance the professional training of rear service school graduates and to ensure the systematic rotation of officers during their service, we plan to shift our higher schools to a command-engineer orientation. In addition, plans call for shifting all rear service schools to an instruction system adapted to professional training programs that entail a basic higher education. Graduates of rear service higher schools will receive bachelor's degrees in addition to their higher education diplomas. Graduates of the Rear Service and Transport Military Academy will receive master's degrees in science. Naturally, our higher schools are currently reworking their curriculums with due regard for the economic changes in the country.

[Sedykh] To all appearances, the technical equipment of rear services will also undergo substantive changes.

[Churanov] The plans for reorganizing rear service agencies devote special attention to military technical policy. In my opinion, it should be based on newly formulated fundamental principles that provide above all for a shift to qualitative parameters in the development of rear services equipment, under the same system in effect for combat equipment and on a common design and production basis.

[Sedykh] Are you worried that today's realities could make substantial adjustments in these sweeping plans?

[Churanov] It cannot be ruled out that efforts to meet our needs for technical equipment will encounter difficulties. Moreover, we have no illusions in this regard and are trying to adapt ourselves to the existing situation. Suffice it to recall that only last year, our leading services—fuel, food, and clothing—each concluded between 1,500 and 2,000 contracts for deliveries of rear service equipment and military stores from enterprises.

However, this is not the main difficulty, as I see it. The main problem is that under market conditions, economic organizations strive mainly to secure a one-time increase in profits, not having realized as yet all the benefits of guaranteed and long-term increases in sales. In this connection, I am firmly convinced that the leading guarantee of comprehensive rear service support for the Armed Forces should remain the state order, albeit on a contractual basis and no longer in the form of directives.

[Sedykh] Vladimir Timofeyevich, a final question. You have outlined some rather clear-cut plans for our rear services. Will we be able to realize these plans?

[Churanov] I look to the future with optimism, and there are grounds for doing so. Lately the officer corps, including rear service specialists, have sensed much greater concern for them on the part of the state. I see a large source of untapped potential in achieving the planned objectives in the growing patriotism of people in uniform and in their sincere readiness to do everything in their power to revive great Russia and Armed Forces that are worthy of her.

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1993

Names, Addresses of Russian Ministry of Defense VUZs

93UM0696A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 2, Feb 93 (Signed to press 10 Jan 93) p 37

[Unattributed article: "List of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Military Educational Institutions"]

[Text]

MILITARY ACADEMY ENGINEERING DEPARTMENTS (DOCTORAL TRAINING DEPARTMENT)

(Period of study six years)

Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy—K-74, Moscow, 103074.

Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev—Zh-28, Moscow, 109028.

Military Aviation Engineering Academy imeni Professor N.Ye. Zhukovskiy—A-167, Moscow, 125167.

Military Chemical Defense Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko—B-5, Moscow, 105005.

Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov—K-9, St. Petersburg, 195009.

MILITARY INSTITUTES

Military Space Engineering Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy—P-82, St. Petersburg, 197082.

Military Red Banner Institute—Zh-33, Moscow, 109033.

Military Institute of Physical Culture—K-44, St. Petersburg, 194044.

HIGHER MILITARY SCHOOLS

Missile Troops

Krasnodar Missile Troops Higher Military Command Engineering School—Krasnodar, 350000.

Perm Missile Troops Higher Military Command Engineering School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov—15, Perm, 614015.

Rostov Missile Troops Higher Military Command Engineering School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin—27, Rostov-na-Don, 344027.

Serpukhov Missile Troops Higher Military Command Engineering School—2, Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast, 142202.

Stavropol Higher Military Communications Engineering School—28, Stavropol, 355028.

Ground Troops

a) Combined Arms

Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy—21, Blagoveshchensk, Amur Oblast, 675021.

St. Petersburg Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni S.M. Kirov—3, Petrodvorets, St. Petersburg, 198903.

Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet—Zh-380, Moscow, 109380.

Novosibirsk Higher Combined Arms Command School—103, Novosibirsk, 630103.

b) Tank

Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union P.K. Koshevyy—98, Omsk, 644098.

Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov—18, Blagoveshchensk, Amur Oblast, 675018.

Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School—30, Chelyabinsk, 454030.

c) Missile and Artillery Troops

Saratov Missile Troops Higher Military Command Engineering School imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major-General A.I. Lizyukov—Oblast, 82, Saratov, 410082.

Penza Higher Artillery Engineering School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov—5, Penza, 440005.

Tula Higher Artillery Engineering School—29, Tula, 300029.

Yekaterinburg Higher Artillery Command School—I-108, Yekaterinburg, 620108.

Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School—3, Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, 140403.

d) PVO SV [Air Defense Communications]

St. Petersburg Higher Surface-to-air Missile Command School—P-61, St. Petersburg, 197061.

Orenburg Higher Surface-to-air Missile Command School imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze—10, Orenburg, 460010.

e) Military Engineer

Kaliningrad Engineer Troops Higher Engineer School—Oblast, 22, Kaliningrad, 236022.

Tyumen Higher Military Engineer Command School imeni Marshal of the Engineer Troops A.I. Proshlyakov—28, Tyumen, 625028.

f) Chemical Defense

Saratov Chemical Defense Higher Military Engineer School—37, Saratov, 410037.

Kostroma Chemical Defense Higher Military Command School—15, Kostroma, 156015.

Tambov Chemical Defense Higher Military Command School imeni N.I. Podvoyskiy—11, Tambov, 392011.

g) Airborne

Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School—31, Ryazan, 390031.

PVO [Air Defense] Troops

St. Petersburg Higher Air Defense Electronics School—L-324, St. Petersburg, 198324.

Pushkin Higher Air Defense Electronics School imeni Marshal of Aviation Ye.Ya. Savitskiy—1, Pushkin, St. Petersburg, 188620.

Krasnoyarsk Higher Air Defense Electronics Command School—53, Krasnoyarsk, 660053.

Nizhegorod Air Defense Higher Surface-to-air Missile Command School—D-23, Nizhny Novgorod, 603023.

Engels Air Defense Higher Surface-to-air Missile Command School—9, Engels, Saratov Oblast, 413109.

Yaroslavl Air Defense Higher Surface-to-air Missile Command School—Oblast, 16, Yaroslavl, 150016.

Armavir Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation P.S. Kutakhov—Armavir, Krasnodar Kray, 352918.

Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Marshal of Aviation V.A. Sudets—Kray, 21, Stavropol, 355021.

(To be continued)

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Visit to CW Destruction Facility 1212

93UM0690A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Colonel Mikhail Malygin and Lieutenant-Colonel Oleg Bedula, under the rubric: "Duty Address—Chemical Troops": "Under the Roofs of Facility 1212"]

[Text] My son is serving at a unit, as far as I can surmise, that is related to the destruction of chemical weapons. My heart aches and I have been upset for my Kolya. Could you tell me with what our children—the soldiers of this military unit—are involved and how safe this duty is for their health?

[signed] Nadezhda Ivanovna Inchina Samara

It turned out to be a difficult matter to immediately find Nth military unit without a guide. You can circle around Chapayevsk and the streams with the same names for a long time and not end up on the narrow asphalt road that leads directly to the KPP [entry control point] of this still recently strictly classified facility.

But the first local resident helped us and told us how to reach the "chemical site", in other words, the chemical weapons destruction facility. But then again, the facility also has a numerical designator—1212—in official documents.

Outwardly, from the reviewing stand, the unit is like any other unit. The entry control point is a small, clean, single-story building with a freshly painted fence and, behind them—are the residential area, the barracks, mess hall, and headquarters...

Incidentally, we met Private Nikolay Inchin near the entry control point. He was performing a daily detail. Having learned that we had actually arrived based upon his mother's letter, he initially did not issue us a pass—he requested our documents and sent them to his superior. And when the entry permit had been completed, he threw open the gates and saluted.

Today, in order to better understand the facility and the nature of service here, we certainly need to discuss its recent so stormy past.

THE IDEA TO CREATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY IN THE VOLGA REGION was hatched a long time ago at the highest spheres. But only in 1986 based upon a decision of the country's government, USSR Ministry of Defense [MoD] and Chemical Industry design organizations developed and the State Board of Experts approved the technical-economic estimate for construction. In 1989, the erection of the facility for development of the technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons that are armed with phosphorous organic substances was on the whole completed.

However, the facility was not lucky from its very birth. The fact is that by that time the flywheel of the agitation and preelection campaign for the local organs of rule had become entirely unwound and the "chemical site" immediately became small change in the campaign of various political forces of Samara, Chapayevsk and Novokuybyshevsk. The population of the rayon's cities and towns did not know what kind of "horrors and misfortunes" threaten them from the deputy candidates who were incompetent in military issues!

Despite the fact that in that same 1989 three commissions approved the facility's absolute ecological safety, a tent city grew up near the entry control point and the Chapayevsk local organs of rule adopted several decisions that prohibit the operation of the facility.

Later ("while taking into account the urgent socio-political situation that has developed"), the USSR Council of Ministers recognized that it was advisable to retool the chemical weapons destruction facility into a training center to develop chemical weapons destruction technologies in inert mediums and to train cadres for work at chemical weapons destruction industrial facilities.

Since that time, according to Unit Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Petr Vlasov, the pathways-roads to the technological buildings are overgrown by grass every year. The USSR has long since ceased to exist. The idea of a training center remains essentially unrealized—there is no Russian government decision and therefore the rest also does not exist—finances, training programs, and the students themselves...

And yet our desire was great to glance under the roofs of the concrete buildings that were located a proper distance from the housing area.

"Of course," Vlasov agreed immediately. "Look at the materialization of 55 million rubles, naturally, still at the old prices."

Our eyes were introduced to shops that were stuffed with the most complex domestically-produced equipment that were at times being stored under polyethylene film. Based on the finding of experts, part of the equipment is unique, it was produced in single copies, and does not have any equals in the world.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vlasov told us about the toxic substance munitions destruction technology. In brief, it is reduced to the following.

A crane loads the prepared munition onto the unloading assembly trolley and is secured to it. Then the trolley is automatically fed into a chamber of a special assembly. Here a hole is drilled into the warhead [bolvanka] and then the toxic substance is removed from the warhead into a storage unit using a vacuum. Then the toxic substance is totally detoxified using a reagent and the

shells of the munitions, after being washed in an alkali-water solution, are tempered in special ovens at a temperature of up to 900 degrees and are processed into scrap metal.

The protection system during the performance of all of the operations is—three-fold. Incidentally, a single stage toxic substance destruction process was customary for the Americans until recently, here a dual-stage system was immediately provided for, and also destruction of munitions in a single item.

"So, you have not destroyed a single munition with toxic substances?", We asked Petr Sergeyevich.

"Not a single one. For well-known reasons, matters have not reached that stage. So, the storage depot was and remains totally empty. And we had envisioned that boxes of munitions would be stored in them. We would have to transport them here from other regions of the country."

THEN WHAT are the personnel of facility 1212 involved with if the unit is not accomplishing its primary functional duties? Strictly speaking, if the unit were accomplishing its primary duties, compulsory service privates and sergeants would not be permitted near the technological buildings. And this information is exclusively for the parents. The primary mission of Private Inchin and his comrades—is the performance of daily details and guard duty, combat training, and also maintaining the vital activities of the most complex military organism. That is also servicing equipment, house-keeping work, and food preparation. There are several horses and cows at the unit and soldiers' hands are also needed here.

We also met with Nikolay Inchin's immediate superior—Company Commander Captain A. Oreshkipyy. Andrey Andreyevich frankly stated: "Inchin—is the best soldier in the platoon. He serves flawlessly. His work is excellent. And he proves to be more diligent the harder it becomes."

We visited the comfortable, bright soldiers' barracks. Its third floor was closed—due to personnel undermanning. On the second floor—bunks in a single tier, curtains on the windows, and cleanliness and order everywhere.

On that day, the soldiers' mess smelled of tasty meat dishes. Bread lay in heaps on trays. The cook was masterfully pouring out fruit kisel.

The conversation once again returned to the facility itself.

Vlasov said: "I will escort you and meet with 'Rossiya' Television journalists. There will be a tour of the facility..."

Incidentally, right now the local mass media is honestly discussing this specific unit. And the people are gradually calming down. Right now cooperation with various social organizations has even been noted.

"But we also need to mention the other," continued Lt Col Vlasov. "I am also concerned. Tens of tons of military toxic substances, the storage suitability period of which is being inexorably reduced, are being stored in depots far from us. Whether we want it or not, they will still have to be destroyed sometime, somewhere, but any delay with this will only create additional difficulties, including psychological..."

Having patted his son Serezhka on the head, he added:

"In any case, we, the military Chemical Troops, if they entrust this task to us at some time, will be able to handle it, guaranteed. Right, Serega?"

Chemical Weapons Elimination Directorate Chief and Troop Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Directorate Chief Colonel Vyacheslav Solovyev answers the questions of Soldier's Mother Nadezhda Ivanovna Inchina.

[Malygin/Bedula] As I understand it, service at military chemical complex facilities is specific and entails a heightened health danger. Are there any additional benefits whatsoever for soldiers and sergeants?

[Solovyev] I want to immediately reassure Nadezhda Ivanovna: her son, like all personnel who are involved with support and guarding the facility, will never go under the roof of the concrete buildings where we will have to eliminate chemical weapons. Moreover, the facility in which he is performing his duty has been retooled for purely training tasks. As for the servicemen who must destroy the toxic substances, these are specially trained people and the government has stipulated an entire series of benefits for them that are associated with salary, food and relaxation.

[Malygin/Bedula] What is the probability of a ChP [extraordinary situation] at such facilities? Are they safe in an ecological sense?

[Solovyev] I dare to assure you that the probability of an extraordinary situation at these facilities is practically zero. This is guaranteed by multistage protection and strict monitoring of the processes of chemical weapons preservation and storage. Here our Shikhany military facility is indicative. Despite the fact that chemical weapons tests were conducted at its facilities, the environment has been preserved at it, as they say, in primordial form. Just like at a game refuge, even rare breeds of animals and birds that have already disappeared in a great portion of the Volga Region are at peace here.

2500 Draft Eligible Youths Fail to Report

93UM0671B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by Pavel Chernenko: "Number of Youths Failing To Report to Induction Points Increases"]

[Text] The deadline set by the Council of Ministers of the Republic for the spring draft of citizens to compulsory military service has expired. But just as last year, many draftees have not reported to the military commissariats.

According to data of the Ministry of Defense, more than 2,500 youths failed to report to the induction centers. We note that this was especially marked in the Minsk oblast. There were 1,400 resisters there (1,000 in Minsk). In 1988 there were just two resisters in Belarus.

Preservation of Military Departments in Civilian VUZy

93UM0671A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Nikolay Poroskov: "The Military Department of a Civilian VUZ: What Does It Give the Army Today?"]

[Text] The smoldering discontent among the students, provoked by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 1986 rescinding army deferments in connection with the growing "demographic gap," took the form of distinctive rebellion. In the student forum, its participants demanded "demilitarization of education" and elimination of military departments at VUZy. But after the right to a deferment was restored in 1989, the intellectual potential of the nation "changed course" and assumed a position which was quite the opposite of its former one. There it remains to this day. And the recently published Law of the Russian Federation "On Compulsory Military Service" only strengthened it.

According to this law, a student can make a contract with the Ministry of Defense in which he undertakes to undergo training in a military department, and upon receiving the rank of reserve officer at graduation, to serve for 24 months in an officer position, but only in the case of a justified decree of the President of Russia (if there is a shortage of specialists in some military profession). But if he does not sign a contract, he will not train in a military department, for which there is competition nowadays, but after receiving his diploma will go for 12 months "to toil as a soldier."

So it is quite understandable that many people have an interest today in preserving the military departments. And not only students.

In front of me is a letter to the government of Russia from the rector of the Samara State Technical University, Yu. Samarin, asking that it not eliminate the military department, for if it does, "student recruitment

at the VUZ, and contracting with enterprises will be hampered." In other words, potential candidates will rush to a different VUZ, where there is "protector" from service. And the managers of the enterprises will not pay for the training of a specialist who will not go to the plant after graduation, but don a military uniform instead.

There were similar letters came from the Ministry of Education, Agriculture, and others. The Cossacks appealed in this matter to the Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy. One can understand the authors of the appeals. Take away the military department, and the VUZ will become female, as occurred at the Krasnoyarsk Institute of Non-Ferrous Metals. They didn't send girls to the furnaces, but only graduated "wives with diplomas." The unintentional feminization of learning has an especially painful effect on the teaching institutes; the male foundation disappears from the schools. We note that with the return of the deferment, competition for the N. K. Krupskaya Pedagogical University jumped to seven persons for each place.

When the military department is eliminated, the VUZ is deprived of the financial resources which paid for military training, and the Ministry of Defense ceases to send it arms and equipment for these purposes, including computing equipment, which may also be used in other departments. Nor can one disregard the fact that the young men receive the skills of the commander and team leader in the military department.

A government committee visited Saint Petersburg in March of this year. With the participation of representatives of the VUZy and the military, it studied the work of the military departments. The Vice President of the Union of Rectors of Russia, Nikolay Proskuryakov, invited his colleagues to give their opinion of civilian-environment reservist training. The unanimous conclusion was that the military departments must be preserved. The arguments were cited above. It is too bad that the chief one among them had faded somehow, as I see it: the need to train reserve officers, defenders of the nation. According to the testimony of a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry, not much attention was paid to the weak attendance of the military department by university students, or to its facilities, which left much to be desired.

In one way or another, the position of those in favor of retaining the military departments is clear. But let us listen to a different argument. It was expressed amply and energetically by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Col-Gen Vladimir Semenov, who appended a resolution to the letter of Rector Yu. Samarin: "So Who Will Serve in the Army?" This question is heard ever more insistently today, since less than 20 percent of draftees are reporting to the draft commissions, while the rest, in accordance with legislation, have the right either to a deferment or to complete release from service. That is why, explain the proponents

of retention of the military departments, even the General Staff is looking to them to fill the "holes" in the draft.

The military, which today is experiencing the fatal consequences of the farfetched deferments, is indeed speaking against many of them. But the situation is far from unequivocal in the military departments. Let's take a count. Of the 497 VUZ of the former USSR which had military departments, 299 remained in Russia. In them, to put it in official language, 235 thousand students are involved in civilian-environment reservist training, 210 thousand of them are males. The graduation this year will number 55 thousand males. Of this number, according to the estimate of a representative of the Main Directorate for Training and Assignment of Cadres of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it would be realistic to order only 10 or 15 percent of them to service: some have already done their training duty, some have the right to deferment, some will go to the military industrial complex or to alternative service. Even with today's dismal numbers in the draft, it will be possible to close some "holes," not many, so consequently a false charge is being leveled against the General Staff.

Then one must wonder, why did it all occur, why the proposal (and the government has the documents) to leave military departments in only 81 VUZy, while the State Committee on Higher Education is insisting on retaining all departments? It is primarily a matter of overproduction of reservists. In the Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate (GOMU) of the General Staff, I was shown some striking figures: according to some military accounting specialists, the numerical strength of reservists will amount to tens and perhaps hundreds (!) of contingents, while two or three are required.

Naturally the question arises: under these conditions, do we have to train reserve officers in military departments, if there are not even any vacancies for the graduates of military schools and some of them go to the reserve. The ranks of reservists are also being actively reinforced as a result of army cuts. In 1992 alone 35 thousand officers under age 30 were discharged to the reserves.

It goes without saying that such a situation won't last forever. The current reserve will lose personnel owing to age, sickness, emigration to nearby foreign countries, and so forth. Every year 160 thousand reservists leave the military rolls. And the flow of officers due to army cuts will one day cease. But the reserve must be systematically reinforced. What should its numbers be in the future? Let us look at the numbers drafted throughout the world. In wartime the army of a highly-developed state amounts to 10 percent of the population, that of a less developed one 5 percent. For Russia this 5 percent would mean roughly 8 million service members, of which 1 million would be officers (one for 8-10 soldiers, by the world standards). A third of them would be cadre personnel, so consequently 750 thousand reservists

would be required, for a single contingent. So what if there were two or three contingents?

The number is impressive. And if as planned, 75 percent of the military departments are to be closed, how much then will the compensation for natural losses be diminished? For since 1989, after the abolition of the reserve officer active-duty training, military departments, faculties and sections of military education have been the only sources of reservists. So does the reduction of military departments pursue an immediate interest, while afterwards the army will be left without a reserve?

No, that is not entirely the case. First of all, the government has adopted a decree to restore reserve officer active-duty training. Second, the Defense Ministry is working on a system of training reserve officers in courses at military schools, on the basis of district training centers. There are a number of reasons for this. The main one is that graduates of VUZy are distributed not on the basis of the needs of the Defense Ministry, but on those of the domestic economy. Those who have received an education in the major student centers (Moscow, St. Petersburg) as a rule also settle in those regions, where there is a surplus in the mobilization reserve. But in the Siberian Military District, say, the number of reservists is an order of magnitude less. That is, it's feast or famine. Slowness or inertia in assembling personnel, if suddenly the alarm should sound, may be fatal.

Now about the VUZy which train physicians, translators, and finance specialists. Do they require military departments? By order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated 8 June of this year, permission was granted to man such vacant service posts with civilian personnel. Those desiring to become officers after graduation from courses can be certified, with subsequent conferral of rank.

However paradoxical it seems at first glance, the existence of departments training specialists of singularly military professions is also in doubt. For example, the commanders of motorized rifle and tank platoons are produced chiefly by pedagogical and agricultural schools. The number of hours allocated for this purpose, the program and specifics of civilian-environment reservist training, it is now quite clear, do not allow formation of a full-fledged commander. But in a number of VUZy, the military-occupational specialty does not correspond to that of the VUZ. The military believes that it is much better to certify an experienced mandatory service sergeant as a reserve officer. Perhaps a graduate of that same agricultural VUZ without a military department, who has taken courses and taken active-duty reservist training. But one thing in these proposals appears not entirely logical: to send even those who have gone through a military department to the line units for mandatory service, and only after that to allow them to receive their rank of reserve officer. Doesn't this alienate all students from military departments?

Of course the system of courses in military VUZ is a new thing and requires a thoughtful attitude. Won't they cost the Defense Ministry a pretty penny? Remember that the upkeep of military departments is paid for not by those with an interest in retaining the departments, but by the state, which transfers funds to the VUZ for the corresponding expense item. One department, in 1990 prices, costs five million rubles. And expenses for travel to the course sites, uniforms, compensation for reservist pay, and for graduates of military departments during mandatory active-duty training must also be paid. It is another matter that before adoption of a decision it is necessary to figure it all down to the ruble.

But the proponents of military departments warn that courses may have a negative influence on the training process in the military schools. Let's see. Based on the already-mentioned requirement for reserve officers, roughly 1,000 individuals have to be sent through each of the 85 Russian military schools. Assume that the reserve training will take place in four waves of 250 individuals each. This by modest calculations means two barracks and ten teachers. But one must also consider that the number of cadets will decrease, and housing and academic facilities will be freed up, and the load on instructors will be less. Roughly the same will occur in the district training centers. Some of them will simply stand idle.

Today military departments train reserve officers in 265 military-occupational specialties. The proponents of civilian-environment reservist training ask, will the military schools and training units in the line units be able to handle such a variety of specialties? But, the Defense Ministry objects, science-intensive, shortage specialties will remain the prerogative of the uncut military departments. No one is making claims against the academic VUZy, where that same intellectual potential was indeed trained. They will continue to enjoy special rights as before. The remaining professions, the command ones, will have 85 of the military schools and training centers. Incidentally, the urgent shortage of certain professions is exaggerated. For example, mathematician-programmers, who are not trained by military schools. The line units require literally just a few, beginning at division level, if not army level.

It goes without saying that the problems of civilian-environment reservist training, for all the pros and cons, should be approached cautiously, and nothing should be changed just so that here too we can turn in the direction of the general transformations. Won't the transformations mean a "brain drain" for the state and army? Remember that the first military departments appeared in 1944. It was precisely during the war that the leadership of the country valued this type of training, and thinking strategically, felt the need to accumulate a reserve of military cadres. The system which has developed and justified itself over decades is an argument in favor of retaining military departments. Attempts have been made at different times to reform it, but everything returned to its former path. The last case was the order of

the USSR Defense Ministry No 321 of July 1991, which ordered a cut in military training in 30 VUZy in September of the same year, and by December of 1993 at another 93 VUZ. Subsequent events made corrections in the implementation of this order. But today one cannot but allow for the reduction in the army, the overabundance of reserve officers, and new approaches to development of the Armed Forces.

It is a sin not to turn to foreign experience too. Here also there are pros and cons. In the United States, with four military schools, there are 1,025 officer training courses at universities and colleges. Congress approves and monitors the expenditures for training reserve officers. In England they have even created 16 university squadrons for the training of an air force reserve. But the main difference from us is that both in the U.S. and in England, they have a contract method of manning of the army and navy, which is only just becoming acclimated here, and only with difficulty. And indeed, blind copying of western experience often leads to dismal results. We have our own history, traditions and national experience. Just recall the musters of the Cossacks. After all, Germany goes its own way by training a reserve solely and precisely on the basis of the military educational institutions.

The Russian Ministry of Defense does not favor elimination of military departments in general, but only favors making the number of graduated reserve officers and the number of necessary reserve officers jibe, and maintaining the list of military professions for a wartime period, and regional characteristics in the formation of the reserve. The conflict of interests of different departments on this score today is evident, but we must be aware that the training of reserve officers is a function not only of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It should become a state program, and the military should act as its executor and an interested party.

Both the proponents of retaining the military departments and the people urging their reduction have weighty arguments. Clearly the government, on which the final decision depends, should listen to both, and draw the best from both methods of training the reserve for the army and navy.

Supsov Approves Plan for Housing Construction Through 1995

93UM0710B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "516,000 Apartments by 1995"]

[Text] On 20 July the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation approved a state program submitted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to provide housing for servicemen and individuals discharged from the military

service into the reserve, personnel of internal affairs agencies and their families covering the period 1993-1995.

The program calls for the construction of 30.9 million square meters of housing space in apartment buildings, or 516,000 apartments, more than 147,000 this year. The government and the Central Bank have been instructed jointly to submit proposals for extending preferential, special-purpose loans for the construction of housing for servicemen and their families, including individual housing, to the Supreme Soviet in the third quarter of this year.

The parliament also passed a decree on transportation using military transport vessels of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense for purposes of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The decree calls for allocating military aircraft and naval vessels equipped with government communication facilities for trips by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, including visits to foreign countries.

Turkish Firm to Build Garrison in Stavropol Kray

93UM0728A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Borozkov: "The Turks Will Build a Military Garrison in Budennovsk"]

[Text] The Turkish firm "Baytur" will build a village-satellite of the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Kray. This became known based upon the results of the competition of six foreign construction firms.

The village will be designated for the Russian troops that are being withdrawn from Germany and the German side is financing construction. "Baytur" guarantees compressed time periods and a relatively low price with high quality of construction. The military garrison will be completely turned over in exactly one year.

Civilian Personnel Not Paid for Three Months

93UM0732A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jul 93
Night edition p 1

[Article by TRUD Correspondent Viktor Badurkin: "Strike Committees Are Being Formed in the Army"]

[Text] Salaries have not been paid to the civilian personnel of many military units for nearly three months. The government not only cannot establish stable financing of the Ministry of Defense but also refuses to index the delayed salaries. As a result, the Federation of Trade Unions of Russian Armed Forces Workers and Employees has demanded that the President—the Supreme Commander-in-Chief—immediately take urgent steps.

The appeal points out that social tension is increasing in labor collectives and strike committees are being formed. And if effective measures are not taken to improve the situation of Army and Navy civilian personnel, then "no one and nothing will be able to restrain people from the most decisive steps in their struggle for existence".

UKRAINE

Ex-Minister Antonov on Prospects For, Obstacles To, Arms Trade

93UM0651B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Jun 93 p 4

[Interview with former Minister of Conversion Viktor Ivanovych Antonov by Olena Lisnych: "Viktor Antonov—'Ukraine Will Not Sell Serious Military Hardware. Perhaps, Unfortunately So'"]

[Text] *Minister of Conversion Viktor Antonov was the sole card that fell out during the governmental shuffling of last month. "I respect the leader. Kuchma said you have to go—and I went," explained the ex-minister a couple of weeks after the dismissal, now sitting at a new desk—the office of the Union of Independent Enterprises. Antonov found a saving way out—he refused to "go to another job," and took a favorable Chornobyl pension. Now he is living with the real hope of founding his own firm.*

Antonov the retiree perhaps answered the questions I had wanted to put to Viktor Ivanovych more candidly than Antonov the minister would have.

[O. Lisnych] Viktor Ivanovych, what do you now expect for the fate of the ten-year conversion program of two billion 650 million karbovantsi? Will the program stumble with your retirement?

[V.I. Antonov] It was not just my idea; it was in general the fruit of a collective. The fact that we did an inventory, calculated the minimal sufficiency of state orders and created a program for the structural restructuring of the sector—that cannot be deleted. The program was in effect in 1992. Production volumes were stabilized, and even increased in the first quarter of this year, and no enterprise went bankrupt...

[O. Lisnych] So the fact that the enterprises of the VPK [military-industrial complex] have remained afloat was assisted, I am sure, by the Conversion Fund?

[V.I. Antonov] That fund, as you know, was formed half from the state budget and half was to be from credit, favorable credit for the enterprises. But there is none of that credit, and the budget financing is insufficient. The sector does not even have a military state order; that is a consequence of the fact that Ukraine has not yet developed a military doctrine. With that kind of success no design bureau engaged in military orders will still be in existence a year from now.

[O. Lisnych] But aren't we manufacturing weapons now? Some 28 percent of the VPK is working on that.

[V.I. Antonov] Well, of course, we are still producing some things—some assemblies, units and constituent items that are supplied to Russia.

[O. Lisnych] To Russia?

[V.I. Antonov] Yes indeed, to Russia. There are orders today from the Ministry of Defense of Russia, and the plants at least have something to live on by filling the orders. If there were a possibility of selling abroad in the future as well, the plants would also be working on that. But those products are not strategic weapons, but primarily parts and "spares" for things that were manufactured in the USSR.

[O. Lisnych] Viktor Ivanovych, why, in your opinion, is Ukraine keeping secret the desire to trade in arms? Why not trade now in the broad arms trade, if that is where we are headed in the future?

[V.I. Antonov] Arms, true, are a very efficient and, I would say, intellectual commodity. True, why not sell them? There are two points here. The first is that we do not have an integral system of arms production. Eighty percent of the constituent parts have to be supplied from Russia, and then the missile fuel, microelectronics and special alloys. In creating the conversion program, we envisaged closing the cycle of production, buying just some of it—say 20—30 percent. That is normal world practice. But since there is no financing, that element of the program will not be implemented.

And the other point. Ukraine has no system for selling arms. No one—either in the government or in the Ministry of Defense—is saying that we cannot trade in arms. There is simply no way to do it. Russia has accumulated a whole structure for the sale and production of military hardware from the Soviet Union. These are Oboroneksport [Defense Exports], the Chief Technical Directorate and the services that are engaged in marketing military hardware, as well as the General Staff. Russia has 120 representatives for selling arms in countries around the world. We not only do not have such bodies around the world, we do not even have them on our own territory. And only now has the Council for the Licensing and Export of Arms been created; a special technical committee is also being created.

[O. Lisnych] Are there firms in Ukraine that have the official right to trade in arms?

[V.I. Antonov] There are two firms that theoretically have the right to sell arms. They are Prohres and Ukrinmash in Kiev. If other firms appear, I think, they will be able to get permission—provided, of course, they uphold the laws and international norms in that realm. It is very difficult to create an infrastructure for the sale of arms all over again; competition, on the other hand, is very tangible from Russia itself, the United States, France and China. Finally, it is difficult, but it can be done. But that was not the strategic approach to conversion in the first stages.

[O. Lisnych] But now?

[V.I. Antonov] There is very little budget funding in the VPK, and we are moving to the stage of shock conversion. Poland, incidentally, took the route of shock conversion, and now 70 percent of their industry is standing idle—there are no financial forces to raise it.

[O. Lisnych] Returning to arms, tell us, Viktor Ivanovych, what arms does Ukraine produce itself, in a self-contained cycle? Pistols for the national guard, at least?

[V.I. Antonov] We have never manufactured firearms, shells or cartridges... But 40 percent of the naval forces of the former USSR were outfitted only in Ukraine, including aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers, destroyers, shore patrol craft and air-cushion and hydrofoil infantry landing craft. Strategic missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles. And now 70 percent of the engines for the helicopters and aircraft of Russia are produced in Ukraine... Ukraine is a mighty nation, and is capable of developing effective military hardware.

[O. Lisnych] Do you see Ukraine as a nation trading in arms in the future?

[V.I. Antonov] I believe so. But no one has sold any serious military hardware as yet in Ukraine without political decisions. Possibly, even unfortunately so. But political decisions are made here slowly and very reluctantly.

Commander of 14th Air Army Gen Lyashenko on Force Reforms

93UM0651A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
26 Jun 93 p 1

[Interview with 14th Air Army Commander Major-General Viktor Yakovych Lyashenko by *NARODNA ARMIYA* special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya in the Carpathian Military District under the rubric "First Interview in the New Post": "14th Air Army Commander Major-General Viktor Lyashenko—'To Be Devoted to the Cause of Building the Armed Forces of Ukraine'"]

[Text]

Biographical Information

He was born in the town of Zabrody in Bohodukhivskyy Rayon of Kharkiv Oblast in 1944. After completing secondary school he entered the Kharkiv Higher School for Fighter Pilots. He served as an officer in the positions of Senior Pilot, Flight Commander, Deputy of an Air Squadron and Commander of an Air Squadron in the Western Group of Forces. After completing the Air Forces Academy in 1976, he was the Deputy Commander of a Regiment, and then Commander of a Regiment, in the Air Forces of the PrykVO [Carpathian Military District]. He was later named Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of a Division, and two and a half years later Deputy Chief of Staff of an Air Army in the Western

Group of Forces. He occupied the post of Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of an Air Army starting in August of 1988, first in the Northern Group of Forces, then in the Transcaucasus Military District and, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, in the 14th Air Army. He completed higher academic courses at the VA GSh ZS in 1989.

He is married with two children. His son is a Lieutenant serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

[N. Lysytsya] Congratulations on your assignment, commander; I would note that it has come at a difficult time for the air army. The combination of units of army aviation with it, first of all formations from the Western PPO [Air Defense] Region, has already started. I would like to find out your attitude toward what is happening in the Air Forces, what advantage there is from it, what problems are arising and how will they have to be solved?

[V.Ya. Lyashenko] Thank you. These are indeed difficult times, and not just for the 14th Air Army but for all the armed forces of Ukraine. But their reformation or, more precisely, their development is underway. This is a complex and painful process. We all have to pass through it, however. Our young state would otherwise not have a reliable armed defender.

The re-organization of our own formation is also transpiring in the overall channel of the development of the armed forces. We are taking under our wing, so to speak, the helicopter units and the structures that support them. The expediency of this resubordination is obvious. We are flying in one sky, and the tasks we are performing are also the same. The main thing is that the specific nature of combat training for us is related, the structures are the same and so forth.

When the helicopter units were transferred to district subordination, the aim was to bring them closer to the Ground Troops. Experience testifies, however, that genuine combat convergence in mutual understanding and interaction unfortunately could not be achieved. And there was an estrangement of the helicopter units from aviation. Now, when we are taking the regiments or squadrons, it must be asserted that the level of flight training among them is lower, and the technical state of the rotary-winged craft is also not high. There are, of course, certain vital reasons for this, of course, but there were quite a few omissions as well. The whole 14th Air Army, for example, is now flying guided by documents that were issued by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The instructions and manuals from the former Union still predominate, however, in army aviation. This is almost like having one group of truck drivers driving under new rules, and another under old ones, on one and the same streets...

And if we were to develop further the idea of transition to truly Ukrainian troops, then in army aviation there is an appreciable separation as well. Our state symbol has

for some reason not yet been applied to many helicopters. Some people don't even want to hear of the Ukrainian language in official interchange. There is, most importantly, a mood of uncertainty among certain groups of officers. They have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, but they do not want to serve them as they should, with full dedication. They also favor going to serve in another state if they are paid more there.

It should be pointed out that no one is forcibly keeping them. But we will rectify the existing situation. This also confirms the necessity of adding the helicopter units to the army. That will make it possible, furthermore, to cut back or eliminate completely some administrative structures.

The expediency of combining aviation and the forces of PPO into a unified branch of the armed forces has been argued repeatedly in the mass media and in various forums. It was substantiated at a practical-science conference that was just held in Mykolayiv. A new branch of the armed forces—the Air Forces—does indeed need to be created, in my opinion. But it should be independent in the fullest sense of the word. We need not only a unified command, but also our own logistical and rear support. Today all support for the air army comes through the district, under the so-called whatever's-left-over principle. It thus turns out that when there is no enough military clothing for them, it is even worse for us. There is a problem with fuel in the district, and our army has nothing at all to run on. What kind of independence is that?

The combination will naturally cause certain difficulties, both for the administration of the air army and for me as commander in particular. It is already necessary to master knowledge of the combat application of helicopters. Then later to look into the specific nature of the electronic-warfare and air-defense missile troops. So we will simultaneously be pursuing a re-organization, maintaining combat readiness and training. But it is essential for Ukraine and its defensive capabilities.

[N. Lysytsya] Viktor Yakovych, since you have brought up training, I would like to hear from you about the results of combat readiness for this year. What have you been able to do and not do in your first six months?

[V. Ya. Lyashenko] I would consider the main result to be the fact that we have been able to maintain the combat qualifications of most of the pilots at a suitable level, and first and foremost the first-class and marksmen pilots. All of the flight units are able to perform the tasks entrusted to them with the assignment of the basic combat crews. Why am I talking about this as a significant result? With an insignificant supply of fuel, when we are able to have one or two flight shifts a month instead of two or three a week, this is truly a good result. We have, of course, unfortunately applied various measures to conserve fuel and maintain a minimal level of flying time. We have even had to send some of the younger

pilots to the training regiments, where they are making flights in the L-19 trainers, which take less fuel than combat aircraft.

That is, of course, a temporary measure, but we have to raise the qualifications of the aerial warriors and not just maintain the level achieved earlier, as well as train replacements for those who are going to be discharged into the reserves. So I would like to see the energy crisis in our nation come to an end more quickly, and us supplied with at least the minimally necessary quantity of fuel. Then, I feel, it will be easier to solve problems that are also troubling us very much—maintaining military discipline.

It is well known that when an army is not engaged in its business, it loses not only its combat skills but also its organization and discipline. We have unfortunately become somewhat convinced of that as we analyzed the state of affairs in the units recently. The number of violations of regulation requirements, and even laws, has increased considerably in the military collectives where there are fewer flights and where there has been less combat training.

[N. Lysytsya] There is another problem among those that were named above and that you will have to solve in the near future—the acceptance, placement and assignment of the young lieutenants...

[V. Ya. Lyashenko] Yes, that really is an important and difficult-to-solve problem. It arises, for the most part, from the fact that we have considerably fewer vacancies than there are graduates coming from the military educational institutions. We need, for example, only a few aircraft engine technicians, but the schools are putting out hundreds of them. Where can we put them? There are not enough places even in other positions, and we are not allowed to keep them over and above the organic levels. We see just one way out—doubling the number of positions in those fields in the flight units. This has to be resolved at the Main Staff as quickly as possible.

Difficulties are also arising with the placement of the young lieutenants in housing. There are not only too few apartments, but also too few dormitories in the garrisons. We are thus looking at various reserves. The barracks were left in Chortkiv, for instance, after the disbanding of the school for junior aviation specialists there. They are now being urgently refitted into dormitories.

[N. Lysytsya] General, you are not a new person in the air army, you were named Commander from the post of Chief of Staff, but most of your subordinates—and that is also some of the readers of our newspaper—still do not know enough about their commander. So share with us something about your style of work, and what demands you make of yourself and the people you work with.

[V. Ya. Lyashenko] I feel that the main thing for myself is to be devoted to the cause of building the armed forces of Ukraine. That does not signify sitting in my office when

I am resolving important issues, but rather sticking my shoulder in, carrying my share of the burden along with the others. Military service is for me not simply the performance of official duties, but the main cause of my life, and I thus cannot approach it any old way.

In work I value professionalism, responsibility, competence, boldness and punctuality. All of that, as well as high moral qualities, are what I feel are needed both for the rank-and-file pilot and for the commander of a subunit or unit and officers of the staff. And I dream of when the armed forces, and first and foremost aviation, will have officers who meet those criteria.

Prospects For, Challenges of Building Modern Air Force

93UM0678A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Russian
2-3 Jul 93

[Article by Lt Gen Avn (Res) Nikolay Kryukov, chief specialist, TsOSI (not further identified), and Col Nikolay Litvinchuk, chief, Scientific Center, Kharkov Institute for Pilots: "What is on the Horizon for the Ukrainian Air Force?"]

[2 Jul 93 p 2]

[Text] Today's Ukrainian Air Force can be described as an aircraft that has detached (with the USSR's disintegration) from a high-flying mother aircraft, but rather than hastening to fix its mechanical problems and start up its engine, it is gliding unsteadily on previously accumulated energy—and losing altitude and speed. The only question is this: Will we manage to stabilize its flight, start up the engine and get it running right before it crashes into the ground?

Having proclaimed its status as a nuclear-free state and having refused to participate in military blocs, in order to defend its interests and territorial integrity Ukraine will be compelled to maintain well-equipped armed forces, including a modern air force. At the same time the chances for the existence of such an air force in our country, especially in the immediate future, are extremely low, and here is why. Large systems, be they technical or social, possess the property of initially resisting their own destruction. However, if the destructive process reaches a critical point, the subsequent progressively faster disintegration of such systems down to their foundations becomes inevitable in the absence of preventive measures.

Something like this is happening in Ukraine with its military aviation system. Such a system is usually a combination of the development and production of armament and aviation equipment, military-scientific support to its development, production, upgrading, operation and repair, flight support, mastery of the combat equipment by flight crews, and use of this equipment for its intended purpose at different levels.

With the disintegration of the USSR the once integral and powerful aviation system ceased to exist. Air units located in Ukraine that became its air force were deprived of their traditional sources of warplanes, and they continue to operate with previously accumulated reserves of equipment, component parts, experience and knowledge. Given the present state of this problem, it will take not less than 10 years to create Ukrainian military aviation industry and put out the first warplane. In the meantime according to different estimates the operating life of the aircraft fleet could only be lengthened by from 5 to 7 years.

Because of the absence of airplane production and airplane armament, currently existing military organizations and scientific centers intended for scientific support (development, production and upgrading) of warplanes and newly established ones are already becoming a burden to the military budget. This pertains in particular to the State Aviation Scientific Research Center (GANITs), which is falling apart at a fast pace: The test pilots having nothing to test, and highly skilled associates have nothing to "support."

Organizations for scientific support to the operation and repair of military aviation equipment are becoming unnecessary in similar fashion: This equipment can be modified and improved only by specialists from manufacturing plants located abroad. Spare parts needed for repairs are also produced there, and Ukraine's aircraft repair plants are receiving practically no spare parts at all.

By force of logic all military aviation currently existing in Ukraine could transform into museum pieces in 5-7 years. And then it will be the air force's turn to undergo disbanding, unless we yield to the pressure of purchasing aviation equipment and armament abroad in order to maintain its combat effectiveness. In this case, however the contracts for such purchases usually carry the stipulation: "...The reliability of operation and use of weapon systems can be ensured only if service personnel—pilots and technicians—are trained by the countries producing them...."

Consenting to the last condition—there is no other choice—would lead to the rapid disintegration of centers providing retraining in the combat use of warplanes, and then of the Ukrainian system for training military aviation specialists and military scientific and educational personnel as well. It would be a hardship, after all, for the state to maintain expensive organizations just so that pilots could undergo training in training airplanes and helicopters, which are of foreign make at that. All the more so because the warplane retraining procedure used abroad may turn out to be incompatible with the Ukrainian procedures used aboard training aircraft.

When combined with the departure of scientific personnel and the best specialists from the army, all of this is equivalent to the collapse of the national aviation system: Ultimately the helicopters, airplanes, armament

and means of flight support possessed by the Ukrainian Air Force could end up to be far from up to date, and serviced and operated by specialists trained abroad.

This brings up a natural question: Will we be able to use the available fragments of aviation industry and scientific collectives to assemble an integral, self-contained Ukrainian military aviation system before it disintegrates? We believe that we cannot refuse to make such an attempt. And if we are going to make it, then we must act vigorously.

The program for forming Ukraine's military aviation system could encompass the following: establishing design offices and aviation industry as quickly as possible; preserving the system of military-scientific support to armament and aviation equipment for the transitional period (until production of warplanes begins); ensuring sensible use of the remaining life of available aviation equipment and maintaining its present combat readiness during this period; keeping the Ukrainian system for training military aviation personnel, and primarily flight personnel, competitive with the world's developed countries. The program for equipping the Ukrainian Air Force could be carried out on the basis of three concepts.

THE FIRST—the concept of a closed cycle operating within a single state. It foresees carrying out the following processes at a high scientific and technical level: design of aircraft, their experimental manufacture, comprehensive analysis of experimental models, series production.

World experience shows that the most sophisticated aircraft are designed by companies specializing in some particular way. The correctness of this approach is confirmed by the airplane design experience of the V. Sukhoy, A. Mikoyan, A. Tupolev, O. Antonov and S. Ilyushchin design offices. In Ukraine there is only the Antonov company, which specializes in developing transport airplanes and in their series production. Consequently from a scientific and technical standpoint, Ukraine can produce only transport airplanes.

THE SECOND—the concept of purchasing the needed models of aviation equipment and the ground equipment and repair resources and systems abroad. Scientific-technical expert evaluation of aviation equipment does not present any great difficulties, and it may be carried out by Ukraine's military scientific institutions.

THE THIRD—a concept based on joint participation in design, experimental and series production and repair of aviation equipment under conditions economically advantageous to different states.

The world's large states are not interested in the advent of one more strong power—Ukraine—within the sphere of their interests, and therefore they will not be in any hurry to share with us their latest technologies pertaining to military production. On the other hand purchase of foreign aviation equipment will make Ukraine completely dependent on the producing countries, and in military respects it will become one of the world's

third-rate states. This is why we need to stake everything mainly on creating our own aviation industry, bringing together all that remains from the Union in this sphere.

[3 Jul 93 p 2]

[Text] There is also another path available—attracting foreign investments, particularly from Russia or other developed states of the world. But this approach will become possible only on the condition that Ukraine intensively builds up its own scientific-technical foundation of aviation industry, since no one will cooperate or even enter into serious discussion with the backward and the impoverished.

For the time being—until production of our own warplanes begins and line units are retrained to operate them—we need to make sensible use of the aviation systems currently in operation. What remains of their operating life is exactly the amount of time that is being allowed to us (and not any more) for establishment of an integral Ukrainian military aviation system. If before this time expires we are unable to organize production of warplanes or fail to purchase them from other countries, the air force will no longer be able to serve its purpose, and it will cease to exist the moment flight crews lose their occupational proficiency.

In this situation, keeping military research institutions and centers, including those presently being established under Ukraine's institutions of higher education and intended for scientific support to the development and operation of aviation equipment and for flight support, intact during the transitional period remains a difficult task. If their financing is to be maintained at starvation rations, then these structures could manage to wither or undergo total degradation before aviation industry becomes functional.

During the time that the aviation system is undergoing establishment, a flexible approach will have to be taken to finding a place for these scientific research institutions and centers within it and to ensuring their survival, and a very sophisticated policy of financing the program of action will be needed. As the experience of the Union showed, financing only the military-industrial complex while refusing to provide material incentives to scientific research associated with the development of combat aviation will cause a brain drain out of equipment and armament development and production, and a considerable loss of specialists in the air force involved in military-technical and methodological research—that is, to the formation of a discrepancy—a gap between the potentials of aircraft weapon systems and their use by flight crews.

Despite a well-financed and well-tuned flight crew training system, even the U.S. Air Force is continuing to complain that the average level of the occupational training of pilots makes it possible to achieve only 70 percent of the potential of warplanes with a given degree of reliability.

In the former USSR, in view of the conservatism of the flight crew training system and the fact that greater priority was placed on flight safety than on flight effectiveness, given aircraft with specifications and performance characteristics equal to those of foreign aircraft, pilots of average training level could dependably master not much more than 50 percent of the operating possibilities of Soviet-made aircraft. And this was when around 60 training and scientific institutions were providing scientific support to flight and tactical training of pilots. Unfortunately, these institutions remained on Russian territory.

In the Ukrainian Air Force, in view of fewer flying hours for pilots because of the current fuel crisis and difficulties in maintaining the aircraft in working condition, the gap between the potentials of warplanes in the current inventory and the degree to which these potentials are realized continues to widen intensively, which is ultimately having an effect on the fighting capability of aviation. The practice we have inherited of allocating budget assets chiefly for the purchase of armament and aviation equipment while financing mastery of this equipment on the basis of the residual principle, and providing financing to training facilities only in the best case, is creating a situation where mastery of the latest equipment proceeds in our country not like it does abroad, using effecting technology, but rather by methods from half a century ago—at a flight run-through site using a hand-held airplane model.

Russia has already come to understand the erroneous-ness of this approach. Here is a confirmation of this: As a result of pioneering scientific research, a system of cadet occupational training making it possible to reduce the expense of flight training by more than a factor of two was perfected in the 1980s at the Chernigov VVAUL [Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots]: either attaining the existing training level with twice less flying time than that established by present programs, or raising the level the flying and tactical skills of the graduate by two times while keeping the flying time the same. This is significant in aviation if we consider that even in the prices of September 1992, it cost 20 million karbovantsy to train a single cadet in Ukraine.

Given the present fuel crisis, such a training system could not suit us better as a way to train cadets in flight schools and maintain a sensible level of pilot safety in line units.

Unfortunately all of these developments have been lost upon Ukrainian flight schools, which continue to work in the old way. And meanwhile in Russia, the Kacha and Yeysk VVAUL went completely over to this system of training their pilots a year ago. In such a situation, even

if we have the necessary aviation equipment and if the Institute for Pilots begins operating in Ukraine, students would hardly wish to come to us for flight training from the near frontier, and all the more so from the far frontier.

Thus in order to maintain the combat readiness and fighting capability of our air force at the required level in the immediate and remote future, Ukraine will have to follow the path of Sweden, France and other countries and stop relying on the decomposing remains of the former Union aviation system, and instead establish its own system, which will require:

- developing, as quickly as possible, a real concept for establishment of Ukrainian aerospace industry on the basis of the military-industrial complex, in combination with attracting private national capital and establishing joint ventures with other states, ensuring their financing on priority;
- accelerating work on the program for developing the air force (the air defense forces). In this case the strings controlling the program and the money allocated to it must be in the hands of the air force (air defense forces) commander, who in the manner of an owner will be held responsible sensible use of these resources;
- transforming Ukraine's existing scientific and production potential into aviation design offices and scientific and production collectives so that the directions of designing the simplest training airplanes and helicopters and the directions of developing and producing a promising basic model of a multipurpose warplane could be determined in the shortest time possible;
- developing a package of measures for the transitional period (until production of warplanes begins and aviation units are retrained for their use) to maintain aviation weapon systems in the current air force inventory in operating condition and to ensure their effective use as intended;
- making further improvements on the system for training aviation personnel, including flight crews, so as to keep it competitive with the world's developed countries, and increasing the social protections afforded to highly valued military aviation specialists in order to stem their departure from the armed forces.

The process of disintegration of the part of the military aviation system we inherited is gathering momentum, and if we miss the opportunity for making a competent decision, irreversible processes will begin for the Ukrainian Air Force, if they haven't already begun.

Spring Draft Yields Mixed Results

Spring Call-Up Ends With Limited Success

93UM0682A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by Major Aleksey Trubitsyn: "Draft-93: Serve by Law and in Good Conscience"]

[Text]

Some Draftees Arrive at the City Assembly Point Voluntarily... With the Police

The spring draft of '93 is coming to an end....

The young men have donned the shoulder boards. They arise in the morning "not by the civilian schedule." They are mastering a previously unknown job. Yesterday they were their own men; today they belong to the homeland....

The main change for the young men who have joined the ranks of those who defend Ukraine's sovereignty and independence has nothing to do with external appearance, however. It is an internal, moral condition, measured by the factors of duty, conscience, responsibility....

From now on they do not have the right to refuse to do something. They have no right to do something halfway, no right to forget that we have a big, common home, the fatherland, which they are called upon to defend....

It is not difficult to find the GSP [city assembly point] today even if you have only a vague idea of its location. Pedestrians and vehicles are rushing to Orositelnaya Street, 17 "a," in Darnitsa. The friends and families of future soldiers are trying to get there by send-off time for the groups of draftees. They all know that the draftees will depart for their place of service at a certain time in the afternoon. This is the only military "secret" about which the administration at the city assembly point considers it necessary to inform all interested parties.

There is therefore no special commotion around the GSP gates. Lists of draftees, the numbers of the groups and the time of their departure for their place of service are available at the KPP [traffic control point]. The total openness of the work with induction youth is a good sign of our times, and this is clear and understandable. The young men will all be serving within the borders of Ukraine. Even this does not suit nearly all of those young citizens for whom the time has come to don the military uniform, however.

"But the plan is still being fulfilled," said Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Balabas, chief of the city assembly point. "The draft has been especially lively the past few days. This is due to the fact that exams have been ending at the tekhnikums and schools. More and more of the draftees are failing to report to the military commissariats, however."

Unfortunately, this induction too has had its deliveries of young men to the GSP accompanied by the police.

Most of these soon jumped over the fence and disappeared in the haze of the Kiev summer day, however.

"What do we do with these individuals," Lieutenant-Colonel Balabas asked in despair, "when the Law of Ukraine 'On Universal Military Duty and Military Service' are empty words to them, when they do not want to hear about a citizen's duty to the state and when the prosecutor's office is in no hurry to make serious decisions regarding the 'evaders'?"

This certainly does not mean, however, that the GSP administration is throwing up its hands in the face of the difficulties. After working with them, many of the draftees delivered here by the police did join the forces.

It is a good thing, of course, when a young man comes to the assembly point of his own will, upon receiving his notice, when he understands the need to fulfill his civic duty, when he is prepared for the difficulties of army life. For now these are still in the majority.

"And we have no problems with them," I was told by Major Grigoriy Voskoboynikov, senior specialist in military-patriotic indoctrination and military orientation of the youth in the city military commissariat, who was attached to the GSP. "We do everything within our power to see that the draftees and their families are kept informed about everything. This involves not just the lists at the KPP. We also have a daily parents' hour from 17:00 to 18:00 on the grounds of the city assembly point, at which families and friends can talk with the future defenders of the fatherland and address their questions to the assembly administration, the group leaders and those who have come for replenishments.

Yes, before passing through the KPP on the way to the railroad station, today's conscripts already know much which previously, in the Union army, it was not considered necessary for them to know. And not just them, but their parents as well. It goes without saying that the present approach relieves a lot of the extra tension surrounding the GSP.

There is much that is new in the manning of Ukraine's army, and it is all designed to help the draftee and his family. This makes it all the more difficult for me to understand the behavior of the so-called "evaders," who try by hook or by crook to avoid their military obligation.

"It is a pleasure to work with people who understand their civic duty and think like adults," Lieutenant-Colonel Balabas said, sharing his thoughts. "I recently had talks with draftees Artur Romanenko, Valentin Chuzha and Anton Valyayev. These young fellows are ready for the service and are glad to be joining the forces."

It is sad and painful, however, to observe those who try in every possible way to get out of serving. Either openly, escaping over the fence, as did draftees Rostislav Babich,

inducted by the Minskiy RVK [Rayon Military Commissariat], Nikolay Koryukov, inducted by the Leningradskiy RVK, and Vladimir Grechen, inducted by the Podolskiy RVK. Or covertly, by bringing to the medical certification board all sorts of statements attesting to nonexistent illnesses....

"What can I say to them? And what can I do with them? Read them Article 1 of the Law on Universal Military Duty and Military Service, which plainly states that the protection of Ukraine is a constitutional duty of its every citizen, or turn the case over to the prosecutor's office? The question is whether the prosecutor's office will prosecute these cases. It refuses to do so in the vast majority of instances.

We have a closed circle. Some individuals break the law, and others, those who are supposed to see that the law is observed, pretend that nothing terrible has happened.

The most offensive conscripts therefore have no fear, even when they have gone AWOL from the GSP. One of them, Yevgeniy Khalamendyk, inducted by the Minskiy RVK, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksey Semchenko, chief of the second section of the rayon military commissariat, is peacefully... taking the entrance exams for the Kiev Teachers' Institute. He has no intention of hiding from the authorities.

Others do go into hiding, to be sure. Draftee Pavel German, as an example. He is being sought by the police, I was told at the rayon military commissariat, but they have still not found him.

What is interesting, experience has shown, is that in 99 out of 100 cases the parents know where the service "evader" is. They frequently even help him hide out. And they all get by with this. Even though we have laws on this matter. The trouble is that they are not applied in the vast majority of cases. And public opinion remains timidly silent.

There is another type of "evader," who does not require the help of the police. I speak of those with made-up illnesses, who come up with so many medical documents it is difficult to believe that the lively young man is still among the living.

"Unfortunately, the general health of the draftees is indeed deteriorating by the year," Major Vladimir Vitkovskiy, chief of the medical commission of the city military commissariat, acknowledged. At the same time, though, there is an increasing number of those with made-up illnesses, who want to avoid the draft. Our commission is therefore forced to shift the focus in its work, engaging more in verifying the certification of individuals unsuitable for military service, ostensibly with legal grounds. It is very difficult thoroughly to check out the documents presented by these conscripts. In the GSP's situation it is impossible to make a detailed investigation of this or that illness. And Kiev has no independent system for verifying the conclusions of medical establishments. When we do not agree with a

decision of the rayon medical commission, we send the papers to the place of induction. They frequently end up with the same doctors who made the initial diagnosis. And the solidarity of the medical community is well known. It is rare for one of them to have the courage to change a diagnosis made by a colleague.

And the circle closes. This is why only one out of five draftees who go through the medical commissions in the military commissariats ends up in the army.

I do agree with the military medical personnel, however, that our country needs a state health-care program covering an individual from kindergarten to induction into the service. Otherwise, we can hardly avoid a shortage of draftees.

And that shortage is becoming increasingly more acute. Toward evening I dropped into the office of Colonel Vladimir Nebeskiy, chief of the second section of the city military commissariat, and found him upset. A special request had just come in, demanding that he put together a group of 100 at once. But where is he to get them? The induction is over, after all.

Desertions Still Frequent, Penalties Severe

93UM0682B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant Justice Oleg Shurko, senior investigator for the Judge Advocate's office at the Chernigov Garrison: "Why Desert, When There Is Guaranteed Leave?"]

[Text] Committed most commonly by first-term servicemen during the Soviet army's existence were the crimes of going AWOL from the unit or the job site, failure to appear following a leave or a TDY assignment and other such circumstances. The law set a fairly stiff penalty for such crimes: up to 7 years of incarceration, depending upon the intent of the guilty party and the length of his absence from the unit.

There has now been a fundamental change in the service conditions. Young people perform their service only inside their state. The number of individuals going AWOL from the military unit has not dropped, however.

The severity of the punishment and explanatory work are not producing results. At the same time we know that in those collectives which have preserved rigid military discipline, cases of servicemen going AWOL are very rare.

Unfortunately, the prestige of military service has fallen today. Military service is not promoted. Draftees feel that it is a waste of time, and many of them try to avoid it any way they can.

When a servicemen deserts from the unit, he not only lowers its combat readiness but also immediately acquires "illegal" status. Since he lacks the proper papers, he cannot find a job. Nor can he show up at home

or with relatives, because he is being sought by the police. He is afraid to return to the unit, because he will be held criminally liable.

Young people untested by life, who could benefit society, find themselves in a difficult situation and set out on a path of crime in order to survive.

These servicemen most frequently steal state property and the personal property of citizens. When caught, they are put on trial. And the punishment for theft is far greater than for going AWOL.

When serviceman Tekuch needed food and clothing, for example, he killed citizen Bunin. The court sentenced him to 15 years in prison.

While AWOL from the unit, Boblyan and Gerasimenko drank heavily and lived a parasitic life. In a state of intoxication they killed citizen Doroshenko.

The servicemen themselves should think long and hard about whether it is worth going AWOL, when they have mandatory leave time. And commanders are authorized to grant them time to resolve any problems arising in their families.

In many cases the families themselves do nothing. They not only fail to prevent the criminal acts of their children but even encourage the latter to commit such acts. Serviceman Belobrov's mother decided that her son had served long enough, as an example, and took him home from a medical facility. The son soon committed a crime, which resulted in his going to prison for 4 years.

I feel that public associations and organizations should focus attention on the psychological preparation of draft-age youth for military service. They should perform better promotional and explanatory work, not just sound off about "shortcomings" in the army. For example, the committee of soldiers' mothers will frequently take action only after the serviceman has committed a crime. This was the case with Pvt Roshchin, who went AWOL from his station. The Dnepropetrovsk Committee of Soldiers' Mothers pressured the prosecutor's office and succeeded in freeing Roshchin of criminal liability and in getting him transferred to a new station, all on the grounds that he wanted to serve in his native city as a driver. A few days later he committed another crime, however, for which he was brought to trial.

In order to have such incidents as rarely as possible, every servicemen must think seriously about the possible consequences of going AWOL, and those who bear responsibility for him must not destroy the life of another with ill-conceived actions.

Supsov Dep Gen Tolupko: N-Arms to Buy Time to Build Modern Defense

93UM0689A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
9 Jul 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Lt-Gen Vladimir Tolubko: "Questions of Nuclear Weapons, Space, and the Fleet Must Be Resolved Immediately"]

[Text] *Vladimir Borisovich Tolubko was born on 3 September 1948 in the city of Krasnograd in Kharkov Oblast. He finished the Kharkov Higher Military Command School for Missile Forces, the Military Engineering Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy, and the military academy of the General Staff. He commanded a crew and a launch group and headed a regiment staff. He was a Regiment Commander from 1978 through 1982 and from 1982 through 1984 he was Deputy Commander of a Division. He was a Division Commander from 1986 until 1991. In August 1992, he became head of the Kharkov Military Universitiy. He is a People's Deputy of Ukraine.*

According to forecasts by special services of the United States (DER SPIEGEL, No 35 for 1992), 12 regional wars may develop in the territory of the former Soviet Union if the economic collapse is not stopped. They will cause the deaths of 523,000 soldiers and lead to 21.7 million refugees. There will be 88 million victims of hunger and 4.2 million who will die from diseases.

At the present time in the United States, they foresee a minimum of five versions of an invasion in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the CIS in the event that this is necessary! And they are making no special effort to hide this....

For this reason, the ratification of "START-1" must be seen in the complex of all military questions to guarantee the national security of Ukraine. I mean the problems of nuclear weapons, space, and the Black Sea Fleet.

The military capabilities of the future armed forces will be determined by strategic nuclear deterrent forces, military space forces, highly accurate weapons, and weapons based on new physical principles. Precisely they will determine the structure and the quantitative and qualitative composition of the armed forces.

In examining questions of military development, we must proceed on the basis of the considerations of the guaranteed defense of the state, minimum necessary expenditures, the utilization of up-to-date arms, and the real military and political situation and willingness for reciprocal compromise.

At the present time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are still unwieldy, have an inadequate command system, are poorly equipped, and to some extent are disoriented because of the poorly defined and sluggish reforms, the unending personnel turnover, and acute questions in the social security of servicemen.

The army is undergoing a painfully protracted period of development.

Under these conditions, what is the basis for the provision of the national security of Ukraine in the military area?

It has been generally recognized and confirmed by many years of experience that nuclear weapons are the most effective deterrent and guarantor of the security of a state. The historical development is such that today Ukraine is a state that possesses an enormous nuclear potential (the third strongest in the world in terms of destructive power!). Based on the interests of national security, there is no alternative in the near future to the preservation of nuclear weapons in the composition of our armed forces.

As the bitter experience of Belarus shows, in the words of Valeriy Tsepikalo, adviser to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus on questions of foreign policy, "Belarus became uninteresting to the West when it declared itself a nonnuclear state...." The West promised \$65 million for the dismantling and removal of nuclear weapons but they immediately forgot their promises after the parliament of Belarus ratified the "START-1" Treaty and declared themselves a nonnuclear state. It is my view that there is no price for freedom.

And since that is the way things are, there are two alternatives for our use of this military power.

In the first version, a decision is made on the establishment of our own nuclear industry. In the final analysis, this will permit Ukraine to become fully independent of anyone in questions of nuclear arms and to provide our army with the necessary arsenal of nuclear weapons. But the realization of this version requires significant expenditures of resources and time.

The second version is based on the principles for the provision of national security that I named and presupposes the signing of bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation based on equality and mutual interests. It is a matter of the joint exploitation and utilization of Ukrainian nuclear weapons. In the case at hand, the strategic nuclear forces are administratively subordinate to Ukrainian command and their forces are made up of our citizens. Their military use is planned and carried out, if necessary, under the control of the presidents of the two states. Such a version of the utilization of nuclear weapons, in my view, guarantees us security and military invulnerability for the time that the treaty is in effect—invulnerability against any attacks, even if the independent policies of Ukraine do not please some among the organizers of the "new world order." Russia and the United States will actively oppose not only the waging of nuclear war but also the unleashing of local conflicts in our territory utilizing conventional weapons as well as the provocation of internal disorders in Ukraine. Why?

Russia will be forced to defend the territory of Ukraine because a nuclear conflict against us will not by-pass it either as a neighbor, whereas the military possibilities of 46 of the 176 Ukrainian missiles are almost equivalent to the nuclear power of one-half of the American land-based missiles. On the other hand, America will not be able to do to us what it did to Grenada, Yugoslavia, and Iraq, because it will be inadmissible for it to use methods of force in the unleashing or support of aggression against a state in whose territory are strategic missiles that may also be aimed at it.

"Wars by-pass strong states," asserts Margaret Thatcher. And in this case she is right a thousand times over.

Considering, therefore, the interrelationship between the nuclear weapons of Ukraine and its national security, I will state my view of the problem of the ratification of the "START-1" Treaty. Nor will I refrain from one quote, this time from the French prime minister. His lips stated that France "...approves the proposal...on nuclear disarmament. We ourselves will go in this direction but after the nuclear potentials of the United States and Russia become comparable to those of France." So why should we not put the question in an analogous way? To oblige what forces or under pressure from whom are we aspiring to declare ourselves a nonnuclear state? I will not try to answer these questions but I do consider the following sequence of actions in the resolution of the problems linked with the ratification of the "START-1" Treaty to be expedient.

At the present time, Ukraine has no legal obligations to the world community with respect to nuclear weapons. There are two possible variants of a parliamentary decision on the question of the nuclear missiles of Ukraine. Before either of them is passed, Ukraine declares itself a nuclear power on the basis of the 1983 Geneva Convention, in which it is made clear that all components of nuclear weapons in the territory of any state are its full or shared property.

Under the first variant, Ukraine ratifies the "START-1" Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to it but under the following conditions:

1. Ukraine postpones the decision on the question of joining the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1 July 1968 until mid-1995, when an international conference and the existing realities will determine its further fate.
2. Signs the memorandum of the four nuclear states of the CIS on limits and restrictions in accordance with the "START-1" Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol.
3. Ratifies the Minsk agreement on the status of strategic nuclear forces, thereby removing the amendment to Article 10 by the president (because of the economic and technical possibilities of Ukraine), where the period for the elimination of the nuclear munitions of Ukraine is limited to 1994.

4. Ukraine signs with the Russian Federation a bilateral agreement on the entire complex of military-technical and military-economic questions.

Under the second variant, Ukraine does not ratify the "START-I" Treaty and makes a decision on the future of nuclear missiles on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements. In so doing, we independently determine the necessary number of launchers and missiles with nuclear armament that will be located in the territory of Ukraine.

In adopting either of the two decisions in the interests of our national security, the most probable and preferable partner for the signing of a treaty on nuclear missiles for Ukraine is Russia. Such a treaty would make it possible for Ukraine to be under the cover of nuclear missiles as a deterrent against external aggression.

Under these conditions, security guaranteed by nuclear weapons will make it possible for us to reduce significantly and reform our national armed forces, to obtain necessary resources, and to gain time for the establishment and rearmament of the army with new and up-to-date types of weapons, including highly accurate weapons and those operating under new physical principles. In terms of their military effectiveness, such weapons are equivalent to nuclear weapons in the event that they are used against state and military command facilities, enterprises, and installations of the nuclear and chemical industry. Having means of waging war that are capable of replacing nuclear weapons, we will have a basis for the future examination of the question of the renunciation of nuclear weapons without unilaterally declaring ourselves a nonnuclear state. During this time, if the appropriate decision is made, it will be possible to establish a nuclear industry.

To support the arguments in favor of the examined version, I want to say a few words about the economics of nuclear weapons, which they do not talk about at all or distort.

According to Deputy Defense Minister of Russia A. Kokoshin, "missile forces are the least expensive branch of armed forces from the point of view of their maintenance. They are capable of performing 60 to 100 percent of strategic tasks but require only 5 to 6 percent of the entire defense budget." It is difficult not to agree with this, considering that last year in the Ukraine the expenditures for the maintenance of the missile forces amounted to 3.9 percent of the military budget, whereas this year they should amount to about 1.1 percent!

At the same time, it is necessary to consider that we are talking about expenditures for the maintenance of 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, although in accordance with the above-named considerations it is sufficient for us to limit our nuclear arsenal to just 46 missiles of the latest class, the production of which has essentially been organized at Ukrainian plants. The remaining 130 missiles can be eliminated, demonstrating a historically unprecedented act of good will. In so doing, by making

effective use of the missiles, fuel, and warheads, one can obtain a substantial economic gain. The silos remaining after their destruction and the entire infrastructure that was established for them can be utilized for the deployment of nonnuclear systems of highly accurate weapons.

In so doing, it is necessary to link all questions with respect to nuclear missiles with the signing of a treaty with Russia, under which it would obligate itself to purchase missiles in Dnepropetrovsk that in the former Soviet Union were planned for the rearmament of the strategic missile forces. This will certainly be of great economic advantage to Ukraine.

The second of the problems that I am considering is the problem of the utilization of space. As the experience of the war in the Persian Gulf showed, it is essential to have various space systems and developed computer technologies for the effective use of highly accurate weapons. It has long been necessary to understand and raise the question of the division of the Black Sea Fleet just as insistently and sharply as Russia and to raise the question of the division of space systems! Today this is one of the most important and urgent questions in the context of the principles for the guaranteeing of the national security of Ukraine.

At the present time, an orbital space grouping made up of about 200 space vehicles has gone under the jurisdiction of Russia, although Ukraine has legal rights to 16.7 percent of this grouping.

Based on the principles of reciprocal compromises, in exchange for concessions by Ukraine in the area of nuclear missiles and the resolution of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine has the right to demand the division of space vehicles and the inclusion of military space units of Ukraine in the overall control of space vehicles with the subsequent establishment (with the help of Russia) of a national flight-control center.

Ukraine has everything that it needs to retain the status of a space power. This also includes an enormous technical production complex for the space branch. There is a powerful scientific potential and a developed system for the training of personnel. There are systems for the control of space groupings deployed in Ukraine, into which trillions have been invested and which must and can yield benefits.

Space is a sphere of activity that is giving enormous profits to the space states at the present time. According to worldwide data, every dollar invested in space research yields \$20 of profit. This profit comes from the utilization of space communications channels for governmental, commercial, and banking structures and from the use of the bases and data banks of highly developed states. Thus, for example, space communications yield profits of billions of dollars a year (a 1-minute conversation with the United States costs \$5 and with Europe it costs \$3). Analogous profits also come from the use of space technologies in terrestrial branches of the national economy, in resolving ecological problems, and

in research on natural resources, meteorology, and navigation. Today others are receiving this profit but Ukraine could obtain it as well.

In other words, the space activities of the state are evidence of a high level of scientific-technical progress. At the same time, today space guarantees a high combat effectiveness for most systems of military conflict including highly accurate weapons.

Thus, it is obviously necessary to have our own national orbital space grouping with the dual purpose of national economic and military applications. The operation and control of space systems in the interests of the national economy and defense must be accomplished by the Ministry of Defense, which has the necessary technical means and trained specialists for this. Such a dual designation of space systems in the case at hand is still another circumstance that makes it possible to strengthen the national security of Ukraine with minimal expenditures.

About the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. In the former Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet performed auxiliary rather than strategic functions, supporting the Mediterranean naval grouping. The fleet of Ukraine, not having a free outlet to the world oceans, may resolve limited military tasks only within the bounds of the waters of the Black Sea.

As of today most of the ships in the force composition of the Black Sea Fleet have actually completed their service life.

From an economic point of view, it is quite expensive for the Ukrainian people to maintain the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the contribution of the fleet to the defense capability of the state is insignificant in comparison with the resources invested in it.

It must be recognized that the Russian Navy will not leave the Crimea and we will not drive it away by force, because that would lead to war!

The basing of the fleets of two states at one naval base gives rise to conflicting situations there. For this reason, it is expedient to lease the naval base to Russia for a reasonable time and for Ukraine it is advisable to leave what is necessary for coastal defense and to locate everything at other bases. The leasing of the naval base to Russia must be linked with the leasing by Ukraine of Russian space ports and test ranges for the launching of space vehicles and the testing of missile and space technology, with cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in the area of the production of missile and space hardware, with the supplying of energy resources and timber to Ukraine by Russia, and with the placement of military orders for the Russian Navy at Ukrainian shipyards.

Time is of the essence! Questions in military and technical policy must be resolved without delay. This is also dictated by the fact that without state orders and prospects for development the military-industrial complex of

Ukraine is on the verge of total collapse. But today the military-industrial complex is made up of specialists with the highest qualifications and the most up-to-date production. By destroying the defense industry, we will be deprived of first-rate scientific and technical achievements and of the possibility subsequently to produce the required systems of arms.

To compare: despite conversion, the Americans are not only not reducing outlays for new developments but are increasing them. Their calculation is simple: whatever direction the creative team works, discoveries can occur in the most unexpected areas.

Only five states among the civilized countries are seriously engaged in the development of all types of arms but 195 purchase them! If the military-industrial complex is permitted to collapse, then Ukraine will join the ranks of the buyers of expensive arms. At the present time, we have production of arms and military equipment that is competitive in the world, for example ships, tanks, and missile and space hardware, which can already yield profits for the state.

The conclusion is that nuclear weapons can give Ukraine 10 to 15 years of invulnerability. During this time we will produce precision weapons and a space grouping with its own operations centers and establish a small mobile army equipped with up-to-date and highly effective means of armed combat.

The attitude of the state toward nuclear production will be determined during this time.

It is necessary to remember that the future of defense is being set today and it is necessary to think about it now. Otherwise it will be too late!

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Fighting Continues 'Successfully' Along Tajik-Afghan Border

93UM0731A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jul 93 p 3

[ITAR-TASS article, under the rubric: "Events and Commentaries": "Tajikistan: The Fighting Continues: The Elimination of the Vari Formation of the Tajik Opposition and Afghan Mujaheddin Continues Successfully"]

[Text] Operations continue to eliminate guerrilla formations of the Tajik-Afghan Opposition and the Afghan Mujaheddin in the area of the 11th Border Outpost of Shursabadskiy Sector of the Tajik-Afghan Border on the Tajik side.

As we all know, an up to 400-man formation armed with heavy weapons—120 millimeter mortars, heavy machineguns, and recoilless rifles—secretly penetrated from Afghanistan across the Pyandzh River on several sectors of the border and have concentrated in the border area near the village of Vari. On 25 July, Tajikistan

Ministry of Defense, Committee for the National Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs forces with the participation of Russian 201st Motorized-Rifle Division subunits began a large-scale operation. It is successfully continuing.

This is not the first case of provocative sorties across the Pyandzh. An Afghanistan Border Brigade headed by the famous Commander Bashir Ibn Vekil Abdulla operates

in this area of Kunduz Province. Despite the repeated assurances of Official Kabul on noninterference in Tajikistan's internal affairs, this commander continuously and purposefully carries out hostile acts with regard to the neighboring country. Military sources have reported that they are being expressed in the transfers of guerrillas-opposition forces and their Afghan "instructors" and arms shipments across the Pyandzh on a continuous basis.

ARMS TRADE

START Missile Production Enterprise Seeks Sales in World Market

93UM0704A Moscow *DELOVOY MIR* in Russian
3 Jun 93 p 15

[Article by Vadim Mikhnevich under "Conversion and Investments" rubric: "Missile Complex Will Earn Foreign Exchange"]

[Text] Domestic ballistic missiles threaten to become one of the leading space carriages, pushing aside competitors from France and the United States in the world market. This was announced at the presentation of the space missile complex "Start," which was conducted last week by the scientific-technical center [NTTs] "Kompleks" and the commercial "Roskombank" that is financing the program.

Having declassified a large part of what until recently was kept under lock and key, the defense complex is continuing to surprise the West with the high level of its developments. Today foreign experts are following the conversion of military branches with alarm, thinking that in the near future their output will increase the headaches of companies specializing in the launch of communication satellites and flying laboratories into space.

The "Start" missiles are the logical continuation of the development under the name "Start-1" based on mobile launchers. In developing it, use was made of a project from the time of the "cold war"—the technology of the SS-20 and SS-25 missiles, which made the potential enemies of that time very nervous. Using solid fuel, the 6-tonne colossus as high as a 10-story house is launched in a few seconds from a mobile platform and is capable of putting loads of up to 600 kg into circular polar orbits.

There is practically nothing in the world analogous to "Start." The missile complex can be delivered to the launch site by any means of transport and in principle it can be launched from the territory of any state with which there is an agreement. The NTTs "Kompleks" working in contact with the Lavochkin Design Bureau and the NPO [Scientific-Production Association] "Energiya" is able not only to put loads into orbit but also to design space vehicles, including up-to-date communication satellites.

Even now there is substantial interest in the offers of the NTTs "Kompleks." It is being demonstrated by companies in the United States, Australia, and a number of other countries that are striving to have their own communication satellites in orbit. According to available estimates, the launching of 1 kg of cargo into space will cost the client approximately \$1,000 and the cost of the launch may be about \$18 million, which is about one-third the world price level.

The cited figures, however, can hardly be considered final, because some experts think that they are clearly too low, whereas the origin of the prices is linked with weak marketing by the world market. A more detailed study of the demand will make it possible to establish a more realistic scale of prices.

As the experts indicate, the services of "Kompleks" will be very competitive in the world market. One of the indications of this is the high reliability of space delivery systems. It is sufficient to say that there was not even one accident in the process of the 300 launches carried out in the scope of the program for the SS-20 and SS-25. The high reliability of the Russian missile complexes naturally lowers the degree of financial risk, thereby making them attractive not only for the clients but also for investors.

At the same time, the missile people intend to reinvest the profits, for the possibilities of the "Start" complex are far from exhausted. Sources of profit may be commercial launches, the custom design of communication satellites and space laboratories, and, possibly, the sale of individual system components in the world market. As was stressed, however, there can be no talk of the sale of entire complexes to third countries.

The carrier missile "Start" differs from its predecessor in that it has an additional third booster stage and a modified design of the cargo compartment, having a larger effective volume. The altitude of the circular polar orbit into which the payloads are put is 700 km. But it is also possible to put communication satellites into a geostationary orbit 36,000 km above the earth. Overall the specifications of the "Start" system make it practically universal, for the miniaturization of the electronic apparatus on board the communication satellites made it possible to reduce their dimensions and weight so that today they are within the possibilities of "Start."

Commercial launches will permit the utilization of the reserve capabilities of the ground-based space observation system under the control of the space forces. Despite the fact that the missile is launched in a preprogrammable trajectory, the launch reliability may be increased if the flight is monitored using observation systems from the ground and water areas of the world oceans. In this event, the processing of the telemetry from on board the vehicle permits correction of the flight, if necessary. They are not yet saying what the distribution of the profit will be between civilians and military people but in any event the latter will not be shortchanged.

There is still one other aspect of the utilization of the possibilities of "Start." That is the removal from space of various kinds of "space junk" that has accumulated there over the decades and that is threatening the ecology of near-earth space and increasing the threat of accidents occurring with space vehicles. It is possible, for example, to "shove" a body revolving around the earth from orbit and to shift it to a descent trajectory in which it will burn up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. It is possible to

"remove" a failed satellite from orbit and return it to earth, thereby saving part of the outlays. It is not ruled out that technologies can be utilized for these purposes that were developed to counteract the "star wars" program.

The availability of a highly reliable and affordable means of putting satellites into space for developers of space communication systems will probably make it possible to renew the discussion of what the concept must be for global communication systems. Let us recall that just two or three years ago there were harsh disputes about which way to go: to put into orbit many satellites for different purposes (telecommunication satellites for ecological monitoring and the like) or to build universal large-scale space platforms, each of which can resolve a large complex of tasks assigned to space vehicles. The latter concept was supported, in particular, by the NPO "Energiya" that developed such platforms while intending to utilize the superpowerful "Energiya" rocket. In its day it raised into space the "Buran" space shuttle, which was conceived as an alternative to the American "Shuttle" project. The project got no support at that time because of the high cost and the high degree of risk. At the present time, with the development of international cooperation and the on-board use of equipment of foreign manufacture, this point of view may be reexamined. The reduction of the weight of the platform may make them suitable for placement in orbit through the less expensive "Start" rocket.

Within the boundaries of Russia and nearby countries, the clients of "Kompleks" may also be commercial structures doing business in the area of telecommunications and striving in this connection to have their own satellites. According to preliminary estimates, the cost of a launch will be a minimum of half a billion rubles in the prices of May 1993. If this figure is taken as a starting point, it is not difficult to calculate the benefit that may be derived from launches in the interests of foreign clients. From this point of view, the investments of commercial structures in the missile-space complex may be assessed as extremely advantageous, because the investors participating in the business may cover ruble outlays in less than a year and completely secure themselves against the consequences of high inflation.

Commercial banks, in turn, have already understood that the financing of conversion with the appropriate project appraisals is an idea worthy of attention, above all because in most cases they thereby make use of previously established values or intellectual resources, that is, that in which considerable means have already been invested. This, for example, was precisely the course taken by "Presnya-Bank," about which DELOVOY MIR reported in previous issues.

If it would be naive, to be sure, to think that today they let just anyone into the defense sector, even with big money—the prevailing mentality is at work. Here they still prefer to deal with "their own." For example, the controlling package of shares of "Roskombank" is held by the enterprise "ELIS LTD" linked with the defense

sector and its director is the chairman of the board of directors of "Roskombank."

By the way, such an elitist attitude toward investors on the part of the defense people is not surprising. It is hardly possible to have a well-conceived conversion program under the conditions in which the country has not developed a doctrine for national security. And since that is so, those who are prepared to provide money and those who need it simply do not know how to organize their interrelations. So far the paths of conversion have been designated only within narrow limits—in aviation, missile building, and a still small number of military branches. Even the very fact of the declassification of individual areas of military production and the striving to utilize its potential for peaceful needs still appears to be no more than a declaration of intentions.

In this respect, the developments of the NTTs "Kompleks" appear to be more the exception rather than the rule. This is one of the branches in which the commercial utilization of its achievements receives support at the level of the government, which in itself can serve as a guarantee for potential investors.

The future will show whether "Roskombank" can retain its monopoly. The necessary volumes of investments are still not showing up. But if the rockets of "Start" are destined to become space carriages, then with the reinvestment of the foreign-exchange profit in the development of the branch its position may turn out to be quite good, for the high readiness of the missile complexes will make it possible to carry out a sufficient number of launches. The first of them—still demonstrative—will take place in the fourth quarter of this year. Somewhat before that it will be possible to get to know the complex at the international aviation show in the town of Zhukovskiy near Moscow. This aviation show sponsored, just as last year, by the German concern "Glache International" will take place in August.

Finally, one last thing. The possibilities of "Start" fit rather successfully into the concept for the establishment of a global system of space telecommunications that is supported by a number of large Western firms, in particular by the American concern Motorola. Let us recall (the newspaper has already written about this): it is a matter of putting into orbit 77 low-orbit satellites under the "Iridiy" [Iridium] Program providing for communications under the principle "everyone with everyone else" throughout the entire globe. Without even speaking of the launch, the "Start" missile system is quite suitable for the permanent servicing of the system in space, which is inevitable with such a large number of satellites. And since Motorola has already begun to monitor the Russian market, it is possible that the "Start" missiles have also entered its field of vision. At the same time, it will hardly be easy for our space firms to penetrate the world market, for it will be necessary to overcome many protectionist barriers.

'Oboronoeksport' Official on New Standards for Arms Trade

93UM0705A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
23 Jun 93 p 4

[Article by DELOVOY MIR correspondent Vladimir Shelepin under the rubric "Report From Brno": "Weapons Are Also a Commodity, but Not an Ordinary One"]

[Text] Prague-Brno—Throughout the past week a considerable part of the enormous fair complex in the Moravian capital was occupied by special displays. An international technological exhibition of military products (IDET-93), the first of its kind in Eastern Europe, was being held there.

According to Major General Stanislav Hromec, head of the Czech exhibition, the organizers of the undertaking wanted to give the producers of military equipment an opportunity to show their modern products, as well as some achievements in enterprise conversion.

Naturally, local plants, organizations and firms were the main exhibitors. The innovativeness of the situation was manifested in the fact that the hundreds of participants included merchants, industrialists and military personnel from the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Austria. The West is actively penetrating into the East European arms market, which for many years was left to stew in its own juice.

The main and only exhibitor from the CIS, the Oboronoeksport VO [military association], the Russian state foreign trade association for the export of military goods and services, was represented by five specialists headed by Anatoliy Kondratyev, deputy director of the firm's Interekspos association.

According to the head of the Russian delegation, many models of our equipment and weapons do not require any special promotion here. They are well known. They are in the arsenal of the local army and are produced in the Czech Republic and Slovakia under our licenses and in close cooperation with us, a carryover from the times of OVD [joint military operations] and CEMA. The main purpose of our participation in IDET-93 was to present Oboronoeksport as a reliable international partner with 40 years of experience in the arms trade.

"Basically, we are satisfied with the outcome, even though we have gained no immediate results. The interest in our displays has been enormous. This time we decided not to bring the actual equipment but to show visitors a 3-hour video of the different models. It is

played from morning to evening, and at least a couple of dozens of people constantly gather to view it—and these are not curious boys but specialists. This kind of demonstration is impressive, particularly after the international exhibition held in Abu Dhabi earlier this year, at which our equipment was demonstrated in action. It affirmed its very high quality and was beyond competition in many respects.

"Our specialists are never alone for a minute. Serious, veteran partners come from various countries. They sign protocols of intent to buy, some of which I am confident will develop into contracts. There are also enthusiastic, newly emerged businessmen acting as middlemen, however, who have no concept of how difficult it is to trade in weapons.

"In our business far from everything is determined by money. A certification of ultimate use is required, as well as several other substantial documents guaranteeing that the potentially deadly goods will not end up where people are being killed today. It is our job to submit cases to the government for consideration, and it makes the decision on each transaction. Naturally, our weapons will not go to such countries as Libya or Angola even at the very highest prices.

"We have no such problems with our Czech partners. They need assembly and spare parts for combat equipment manufactured under our licenses and are interested in modern types of weapons, which it is more advantageous to purchase as finished products than to set up their own production facilities.

"Even when there is a reciprocal interest in buying and selling, however, it all depends upon the payment terms. In the past we allowed ourselves to deliver products on long-term credit and to engage in direct barter. Everything is different today. Enterprises in Russia need not just dependable orders but also cash for wages and new development projects. The high level of science and technology incorporated in products of the VPK [military-industrial complex], which measure up to the highest world standards, are a valuable commodity—a currency-generator, one might say.

"What we have said does not mean that we want to reduce everything to the most simple common, commodity-money denominator. If we see that a partner is truly interested in buying, we have to find ways and methods acceptable to both sides. On the broader scale we are in favor of renewing the close cooperation which previously existed in this field—but now based on market conditions and principles of mutual benefit. In some cases barter is possible. Not direct barter but barter based on reciprocal input."

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Guards Discuss Situation in Tajikistan

93UM0694A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jul 93 pp 1,3

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Anatoliy Ladin: "The Death of Russian Border Guards... Is a National Tragedy"]

[Text]

Our Correspondent Transmits from the Tajik-Afghan Border

For 11 hours, the 12th Border Post battled with bands from Afghanistan that outnumbered them by nearly a factor of five(!). For another two hours, Subunit Deputy Commander Lieutenant Andrey Merzlikin withdrew while fighting the 19 border guards who remained alive from under fire (another two were discovered after the defeat of the bandits).

It's best of all to hear those who on that day were alongside those who died and who shoulder to shoulder met the enemy and emerged the victor in an unequal engagement.

BORDER POST DUTY OFFICER SERGEY PANKIN SAID:

"On 13 July at approximately 4 a.m., Private Azamat Aminov, who was performing external guarding of the post, ran into the barracks. Right from the threshold: "'Dukhi' [Dushman] are there (he waved his hand toward the stream) and there (he indicated the hills)! 'Wake up the men, quickly...'"

The guerrillas (as they later calculated, there were significantly more than 200 men), having noted movement in the post, opened furious fire.

FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION BORDER TROOPS GROUP IN TAJIKISTAN CHIEF OF STAFF—FIRST DEPUTY COMMANDER COLONEL VALERIY KOCHENOV'S REPORT:

"After three hours of fighting, the enemy began to infiltrate the post and to break through the border guards' perimeter defense. From 7 a.m., the engagement began to take on the character of a point of resistance confrontation. In the situation that had developed, the actions of Post Commander Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Mayboroda were skillful and competent. However, he did not have long to control the engagement. Mayboroda received a serious wound from the explosions of two

jet-propelled rounds. His Deputy, Lieutenant Andrey Merzlikin assumed responsibility for command.

"On that day, Mikhail Mayboroda had his younger brother Ivan with him. He was not yet a soldier, he only planned to put on the uniform. Mikhail managed to have his brother conscripted into the border troops, precisely to his unit at the 12th Border Post.

"But fate turned out otherwise. Ivan performed his soldier's duty prior to becoming a soldier. When the engagement began, having taken an assault rifle in his hands, he fought along with the border guards."

FROM A CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY OUT-POST COMMANDER LIEUTENANT ANDREY MERZLIKIN:

"So it turned out that the post commander who, incidentally, died, could not in a timely manner open the depot with the primary combat supplies on hand. Later, in general, we found ourselves cut off from the barracks. In a word, you can't say anything else but that we found ourselves in a serious situation. The time came when everyone who could shoot was put into action. And the anticipated reinforcements did not come, although we knew that they knew about our fate—a reconnaissance helicopter had flown in. I told the combat soldiers that help would arrive by eleven o'clock. They believed me and they continued to fight. They seized the dushman's assault rifle and his supply of rounds. But this captured equipment did not last long. My combat soldiers were dying around me. How much longer could we hold out? I remembered that there were rounds in my room. But the post's officers quarters were under fire. A sniper was especially sharp and fired, the scoundrel, you couldn't raise your head. But I had to go. I wanted to go myself. But the lads who were with me did not want to hear that. Someone simply said: 'What's the matter with you, comrade lieutenant, if something happened to you, what would happen to us later...'"

"In short, Private Dodokolonov went after the rounds. An enormous thanks to him from all of us. He managed to bring back ammunition containers."

FROM COLONEL VALERIY KOCHENOV'S REPORT:

"As soon as we learned about the attack on the 12th Border Post, Moscow Border Detachment Commander Lieutenant Colonel Vasilii Masyuk headed a reserve team and went to the post's assistance. But the path they had to travel was not a close one—approximately 80 kilometers through mountainous terrain. The reserve found itself in the area of the border post at 9:15. But it ended up in an ambush about 1.5 kilometers from the border post.

**FROM THE CONVERSATION WITH LIEUTENANT
ANDREY MERZLIKIN:**

"After midday, I lost hope for assistance. I could see that a little bit more and that was it... Obviously, the Mujaheddin also sensed that we were running out of ammunition. I had to do something. I decided to lead the remaining border guards out with me. We had to scramble up the mountains but almost all of us already had wounds or contusions. Aminov and Magomayev had received especially serious wounds. What would happen to them? We took them with us and attempted to drag them up the mountain. But where could we go... After the 11-hour battle, people could hardly move. Aminov, seeing the condition of his comrades, once again displayed courage: he asked us to leave him behind, to hide him, and to come back for him later. There was no pursuit of us, the Mujaheddin didn't risk pursuing us. We later found Aminov, he remained alive, although his wound is very serious.

THE LATEST NEWS:

As Our Correspondent Anatoliy Ladin has reported, on the morning of 15 July, mortars opened fire upon Moscow Border Detachment 11th Border Post from the bridgehead seized by the opposition guerrillas and Mujaheddin near the village of Vari. Up to 20 mortar rounds exploded on the territory of the post. Fortunately, there were no victims among the Russian border guards.

**Spetsnaz Unit Attacked, Turns Over Weapons in
North Ossetia**

93UM0729A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 93 p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga: "Spetsnaz Surrendered Their Weapons Without a Fight"]

[Text] This unprecedented event occurred last Saturday in North Ossetia.

North Caucasus Military District Spetsnaz and a reconnaissance battalion were ambushed while returning from planned exercises. As reported to an IZVESTIYA correspondent and to the Main Military Procurator's Office, 27 guerrillas, having occupied a favorable position, blockaded a very narrow mountain path along which the Russian servicemen were descending. Subunit Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kukov decided not to risk personnel and ordered them to surrender their weapons without resistance. In the opinion of the military lawyers, Kukov thus saved people but "lost face" because 27 assault rifles, two sniper rifles, a machinegun, seven grenade launchers, four radio transceivers and a lot of ammunition ended up in the guerrillas' hands.

It has not yet been precisely established whose guerrillas they were and it is still unknown at the present time where the weapons seized from the Spetsnaz are being stored. An investigation is being conducted. One thing is clear right now—the level of training of that "Spetsnaz" barely corresponds to the name.

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